

# Tactical Operations of Service Region Dimensioning, Bundling, and Matching for On-Demand Food Delivery Services

Kaihang Zhang<sup>a</sup>, Jintao Ke<sup>a, \*</sup>, Hai Wang<sup>b,c</sup>, and Yafeng Yin<sup>d,e</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Hong Kong*

<sup>b</sup>*School of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University*

<sup>c</sup>*Heinz College of Information Systems and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University*

<sup>d</sup>*Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Michigan*

<sup>e</sup>*Department of Industrial and Operations Engineering, University of Michigan*

## Abstract

On-demand food delivery (OFD) services have experienced a significant surge in popularity in recent years, which poses various challenges for service operators. To address these challenges, this paper presents an analytical model that captures the complex interplay of the OFD system by considering factors such as adjustable service region size and order bundling. We investigate how key decision variables, namely the maximum delivery distance and bundling ratio, affect the system's endogenous variables and two critical system performance metrics: customer total waiting time and order throughput. Our analysis yields several intriguing managerial insights. First, the maximum delivery distance has a non-monotonic impact on the customer accumulation time, delivery time, and total waiting time, and there is a “win-win” situation in which increasing the maximum delivery distance benefits both the customer total waiting time and order throughput. Second, order bundling is crucial under high customer demand to ensure adequate food delivery supply, but it is less desirable under low customer demand due to increased detour distances in delivery. We further explore strategies for minimizing customer total waiting time (by setting small service regions and bundling ratios) and order throughput (by establishing larger service regions). Recognizing the partial conflict between these two objectives, we identify a Pareto-efficient frontier that serves as a guideline for service operators in balancing these competing goals.

*Keywords: food delivery; on-demand services; equilibrium; tactical strategy design*

## 1 Introduction

On-demand food delivery (OFD) service, which allows customers to enjoy take-out meals at home without visiting restaurants in person, has seen substantial growth in recent years. This increase in popularity can be attributed to the widespread use of smartphone technologies and has been further accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic since people are often reluctant to outdoor activities (Li et

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\*Corresponding author (kejintao@hku.hk) at: Haking Wong Building F6-05, Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

1 al., 2020; The Business Research Company, 2023). Many OFD platforms have emerged worldwide  
2 to meet continuously increasing OFD demand, such as Uber Eats and DoorDash in the US, Meituan  
3 in China, Deliveroo in Europe, and Grab Food in Southeast Asia. These OFD platforms help  
4 customers easily locate and order their preferred meals while also providing working opportunities  
5 for food delivery drivers (also called couriers). However, as the market expands, these platforms  
6 face considerable challenges in efficiently operating the service to accommodate a growing volume  
7 of orders. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the OFD system is crucial for managing such a  
8 service, especially in terms of insights into developing effective operating strategies.

9 The OFD system comprises three entities: merchants (i.e., restaurants; hereinafter, we use the  
10 terms “restaurant” and “merchant” interchangeably), customers, and drivers (i.e., meal couriers).  
11 Drivers are classified into two statuses, “vacant” and “working”. Working drivers are occupied with  
12 delivery tasks and vacant drivers remain on standby for task allocation. As a normal practice,  
13 the OFD platform dispatches a vacant driver to collectively pick up a bundle of meal orders at  
14 a restaurant and deliver them to customers’ locations sequentially. The objective of the OFD  
15 platform is to manage limited transportation resources (meal couriers) to increase the number of  
16 customers who can be served while maintaining or improving service quality, such as by reducing  
17 customers’ waiting time for meal delivery.

18 In this study, we examine the tactical strategies employed in the OFD market, considering  
19 factors such as adjustable service region sizes, order bundling, and batch-matching processes. Our  
20 emphasis lies on the tactical impact of these operations on the market, rather than on long-term  
21 strategic goals. Tactical strategy design aims to assess the impact of decisions at a level higher than  
22 operational strategies (e.g., real-time driver dispatching), yet not as high as those that consider  
23 long-term effects, such as customer and driver dissatisfaction. Two major decision variables are  
24 considered: maximum delivery distance  $R$  and bundling ratio  $k$ . The maximum delivery distance  
25 affects the size of the service region for the merchant, with only customers within the area eligible  
26 to order from the specific merchant. A smaller maximum delivery distance may exclude some  
27 demand and reduce the number of customers served, while a larger distance may accommodate  
28 more demand at the cost of longer delivery times. The bundling ratio, which represents the average  
29 number of orders in the system that drivers deliver per task, significantly impacts both customer  
30 waiting time and driver routing. A larger bundling ratio enables drivers to deliver more orders  
31 per trip, thereby increasing the capacity of the food delivery system and potentially allowing the  
32 platform to serve more customers. However, bundling more orders per trip may also lead to longer  
33 waiting times for customers due to increased delivery duration and the need to accumulate a larger  
34 number of orders.

35 These decisions directly or endogenously impact the entire system and consequently result in  
36 a substantial influence on market performance. From the perspective of customers, we consider  
37 customer total waiting time to describe customers’ experience in the OFD service (from order  
38 request to meal delivered). From the OFD platform’s perspective, we consider order throughput—  
39 the quantity of customer demand that can be served by the system per unit of time. A larger  
40 order throughput indicates that the platform has the ability to serve a large number of customers  
41 and generate higher profits. However, objectives to improve customer waiting time and order  
42 throughput may conflict with each other, and the trade-off must be carefully identified.

43 We develop an aggregate model to study tactical strategies for the OFD system in a steady-state  
44 equilibrium. Regarding the two decision variables discussed in previous paragraphs, it is important  
45 to note that they are not directly or homogeneously controlled by the platform in real-world practice.  
46 Rather, these decisions may differ across regions and stem from higher-level, specific policies. For

1 instance, a platform might subsidize drivers to bundle more orders during peak hours to enhance  
2 delivery supply or request merchants to expand their delivery areas to serve a greater number of  
3 customers. These policies are tailored to address distinct needs and are ultimately reflected in  
4 changes to decision factors. Consequently, to streamline our analysis in this study, we concentrate  
5 on the tangible manifestations of operations, treating the maximum delivery distance and bundling  
6 ratio as decision variables. This approach assumes that these variables can be manipulated through  
7 specific, high-level operations. Despite the potential weakness of our simplification, this approach  
8 allows us to provide an analytical framework for examining intricate operations related to service  
9 region size and bundling strategy. Our proposed modeling framework incorporates a batch-matching  
10 mechanism (we use  $\tau$  to represent the matching time interval) that considers order bundling within  
11 a specific service region. We use the continuum approximation (CA) technique to approximate  
12 pickup/delivery route length and leverage its advantage to study the impact of maximum delivery  
13 distance and bundling strategy on the system performance. The paper’s major contributions are  
14 as follows.

- 15 1. We clearly define an analytic framework for the OFD market and figure out four scenarios  
16 of the OFD market based on supply–demand relationships using two criteria. The first  
17 criterion concerns the relationship between supply and demand—specifically, whether the  
18 market is demand-dominant or supply-dominant. This is determined by whether the number  
19 of accumulated order bundles is greater than the number of vacant drivers (demand-dominant)  
20 or not (supply-dominant). The second criterion involves whether drivers have to wait at the  
21 restaurant for meal pickups, since drivers may arrive at the restaurant before the meals are  
22 prepared and ready for pickup.
- 23 2. We study the equilibrium states of an OFD market under each market scenario. Our model  
24 provides closed-form solutions for important endogenous variables, such as customer total  
25 waiting time, customers’ delivery time, and more (see [Table 1](#)).
- 26 3. Our analysis offers managerial insights, including but not limited to, (a) maximum delivery  
27 distance has a non-monotonic effect on customer accumulation time, delivery time, and total  
28 waiting time, and there exists a win-win scenario in which increasing maximum delivery  
29 distance can benefit both customer waiting time and order throughput; (b) a larger bundling  
30 ratio benefits the system by increasing the average number of orders a driver could serve in a  
31 trip, but it hurts the system by prolonging customers’ waiting time. We find that the order  
32 bundling strategy is favored in circumstances with higher customer demand, but it is not  
33 desirable for the system when demand is low.
- 34 4. We investigate optimal tactical strategies aimed at optimizing either customer waiting time  
35 (reflecting customer satisfaction) or order throughput (reflecting the market scale). We also  
36 derive the Pareto-efficient frontier, which aligns the two objectives by solving a bi-objective  
37 optimization problem. This enables us to pinpoint the trade-offs between providing high-  
38 quality service and maximizing the market size.

39 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. [Section 2](#) provides a literature review of related  
40 work and discusses a gap in the research. [Section 3](#) presents details of the model and analysis.  
41 [Section 4](#) presents a closed-form solution for the OFD system and model properties. [Section 5](#)  
42 discusses tactical strategies under two objectives. [Section 6](#) describes a set of numerical experiments  
43 and validates the properties and insights, and [Section 7](#) concludes. All proofs are contained in the  
44 Appendices.

## 2 Literature review

OFD services belong to a category called transportation-enabled services (see Wang (2022) and Agatz et al. (2024)) which includes many sub-services such as ride-sourcing (see Wang and Yang (2019)) and on-demand vehicle-sharing services (e.g., Benjaafar et al. (2022)), among others. Different methodologies are applied for supply–demand management and we classify the literature into three categories, namely data-driven approaches, network analysis, and aggregate modeling analysis.

The first cluster of research utilizes the availability of OFD datasets and derives policy implications. For example, empirical analyses including Mao et al. (2019) on customer behavior, Liang et al. (2024) on merchant behavior, and Nguyen-Phuoc et al. (2022) on driver behavior provide valuable insights into the OFD market. Alternatively, machine learning–based methods are also popular to conduct demand analysis. Zhu et al. (2020) estimate order-fulfillment cycle time using a deep neural network, and Liang et al. (2023) predict the demand range in OFD using a Poisson-based distribution prediction approach. The second stream of studies focuses on optimization models and the allocation of resources at a network level, such as routing problems for pickup and delivery (Yildiz and Savelsbergh, 2019b; Reyes et al., 2018) and order assignment problems (Liu et al., 2021; Ye et al., 2024a). Since the optimization problem is usually NP-hard, acceleration in the problem-solving process is essential. Some of these optimization frameworks are data-driven, e.g., Yang et al. (2024) and Behrendt et al. (2023), while some use heuristics to solve the problem efficiently (e.g., Simoni and Winkenbach (2023)). These works focus on problems in short-term operations such that the methods can be readily implemented in real practice while they are typically problem-oriented thus lacking of high-level interpretation of the market, which is another direction of the literature. The third stream develops analytical models for the behavior of customers, drivers, and restaurants and their endogenous interactions. This paper falls into this category. These models can provide managerial insights for OFD platform operators. Some arguments are regarding the downside of online platforms to the market. For instance, Baron et al. (2023) find that the online ordering option for traditional brick-and-mortar stores may hurt both customers’ individual utility and social welfare which is discussed by Chen et al. (2022) as well. Others argue the benefits of OFD services and the ways to improve the service level (e.g., Bahrami et al. (2023); Ye et al. (2024b)). The intricate discussions surrounding these conflicts highlight the complexity inherent in the OFD market, thereby necessitating a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of this particular market. These works analyze the system from a high-level perspective and usually adopt approximation methods (see Wang and Odoni (2016), Zha et al. (2018), etc.) or economic analysis (see Yang and Yang (2011), Zhou et al. (2022), etc.) to study the average behavior of the system, and ultimately draw managerial insights into operations.

Motivated by the challenges of the platform operation of OFD, it is important to understand the service system from a high-level perspective. Tactical design problem including fleet sizing and service region design plays an important role. Yildiz and Savelsbergh (2019a) are the first, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to develop a single-restaurant model and find insights into the impact of the service region on profit. Bahrami et al. (2023) construct a strategy for designing the pricing and staffing problems and examine the interactions between the three parties (customers, merchants, and drivers). Ye et al. (2024b) develop a physical model on matching and delivery and study the market demand-supply equilibrium within an optimization framework from an aggregate perspective. Their work provides managerial insights into OFD operations in bundling and pricing strategies. Ke et al. (2024) develop a model to characterize the equilibrium of the OFD system and provide strategies for various market scenarios. Drawing on real-world data, they argue that drivers

1 might spend extra time for drivers after arriving at the merchant, which contradicts assumptions  
2 in previous studies.

3       Prior studies have addressed several problems, but few have focused on optimizing key tactical  
4 decision variables. Moreover, some essential characteristics of OFD markets have not been thor-  
5 oughly explored. First, the joint consideration of order bundling and service region sizing has not  
6 been well studied from a high-level perspective, nor has it had an impact on the interactions with  
7 other market players. Second, most studies primarily concentrate on monetary variables, such as  
8 driver commissions and delivery fees without paying adequate attention to critical tactical decisions  
9 together such as maximum delivery distance and bundling ratio. Our study aims to fill this gap in  
10 the research by developing an analytical model to describe the equilibrium of an OFD market and  
11 the complex relationships between the system’s endogenous variables and the platform’s decisions.  
12 The model considers the tactical operation, in which the operation strategies have an impact on  
13 the OFD system, but do not yet lead to long-term effects such as customer dissatisfaction. Our  
14 model outlines the market-clearing conditions under which the customer arrival rate equals the  
15 idle driver arrival rate, as well as the transitions of drivers among idle, pickup, and delivery sta-  
16 tuses. Specifically, we examine the impacts of two decision variables (maximum delivery radius  
17 and bundling ratio) on system performance and offer managerial insights. Furthermore, we analyze  
18 optimal tactical strategies for customer total waiting time and/or order throughput and identify  
19 the Pareto-efficient curve on bi-objective operations.

## 20 **3 Model**

21 This section provides the details of our model for the OFD system in an equilibrium state. Notation  
22 is summarized in [Table 1](#).

### 23 **3.1 How the on-demand food delivery system works**


24 The OFD system is composed of three market players, i.e., customers, drivers, and merchants.  
25 On top of them, there is a central platform having the decision power to influence the market  
26 such as matching and driver assignment (in some markets, there are multiple platforms competing  
27 with each other but in this study, we treat the platform as one player). In reality, the platform  
28 normally dispatches customer orders to drivers dynamically based on real-time delivery supply  
29 and demand situations and uses some carefully designed metrics depending on driver proximity,  
30 on-time performance, and drivers’ behavior, among others. According to a recent report by a  
31 Chinese leading OFD company Meituan (Zhao et al., 2024), the platform also holds the flexibility  
32 to postpone the order assignment to seek a better matching result, interpreted as batch matching,  
33 and its benefit is amplified by the bundling delivery strategy.

34 In this study, we study the OFD system at an aggregate level, which means we attempt  
35 to build a stylized model to represent the most important features of the market regarding our  
36 research focus but maintain the simplest possible model structure. Also, we study the average  
37 behavior of market players and analyze the high-level insights into the impact of decision variables  
38 which are the maximum delivery distance  $R$  and the bundling ratio  $k$ . We consider a market  
39 where there are multiple restaurants distributed across a region and customers who are interested  
40 in ordering food from some restaurant are spread around each of them. The platform allows  
41 customers within a fixed delivery region within the maximum delivery distance to order food from  
42 the merchant. The distribution of customers in the space should follow certain distributions that

**Table 1:** Notation

Notation	Description
Exogenous variables	
$M$	Number of merchants in the area studied
$N$	Total number of drivers (vehicle fleet size)
$v$	Average speed of drivers
$\delta$	Customer demand density rate
$\eta$	Coefficient to calibrate the return-pickup route length
$\tau$	Matching interval
$\tau_M$	Merchant's average meal preparation time for one order
Decision variables	
$k$	Bundling ratio, number of orders per delivery batch
$R$	Maximum delivery distance
System metrics	
$W_c$	Customer total waiting time
$q_t$	Order throughput of the OFD system
Waiting times	
$W_{c,a}$	Customer waiting time for order accumulation for a bundle
$W_{c,d}$	Customer average delivery time
$W_{c,q}$	Customer expected waiting time for matching
$W_{fp}$	Waiting time due to food preparation
$W_p$	Return-pickup time for drivers
$W_v$	Driver total time of being vacant and working statuses
$W_{v,d}$	Driver total delivery time in a trip
$W_{v,q}$	Driver expected waiting time for matching
Intermediate variables	
$q$	Realized order arrival rate from customers
$\lambda$	Arrival rate of vacant drivers
$\lambda_0$	Matching rate between drivers and order bundles
$N_b$	Number of order bundles at the end of the matching interval (before next matching decision)
$N_s$	Number of awaiting drivers at the restaurant for meal preparation at the end of the matching interval (before next matching decision)
$N_v$	Number of vacant drivers at the end of the matching interval (before next matching decision)
$N_w$	Number of working drivers at the end of each matching interval (before next matching decision)
$L_d$	Driver approximated delivery distance
$L_a$	Driver approximated axial travel distance of delivery
$L_p$	Driver approximated return-pickup distance
$L_t$	Driver approximated transversal travel distance when delivering
$p_c$	Matching probability of order bundles
$p_v$	Matching probability of drivers
$r$	Distance from customer to merchant
$\theta$	Angle of the half-sector of each delivery driver's delivery area

1 can be extracted from real-world data or be predetermined as a priori. We will show in the next  
2 subsection how to mathematically formulate the customer demand. Although we assume a uniform  
3 distribution of customers in the analysis of model properties, we leave a general illustration in  
4 the model introduction and formulation. On the other hand, drivers are considered to follow an  
5 approximated routing behavior, and in this study, we use the continuum approximation method to  
6 describe drivers' delivery routing.



**Figure 1:** Flow of the on-demand food delivery system. Yellow bars represent customers who choose the merchant for OFD service. Red bars represent merchants who submit batches of orders. Blue bars represent drivers.

1 The OFD system in this study is based on a batch-matching process that happens every  $\tau$   
 2 amount of time (the matching time interval), which means that the matching is not instantaneously  
 3 happening every moment but periodically. Although subsequent analysis reveals that the matching  
 4 interval should be set small, we leave it into the model for completeness and interpretability. Having  
 5 this postponing matching normally provides better matching results (Yang et al., 2020) with a  
 6 sacrifice of minor waiting time (i.e., the matching interval). Some other postponing behaviors such  
 7 as delaying a bundle to another matching cycle (e.g., see Zhao et al. (2024)) is not considered in  
 8 this study. This batch-matching base setting has been adopted by other on-demand services (e.g.,  
 9 Yang et al. (2020); Li et al. (2024)) and it is also used by some major OFD service providers, such  
 10 as Meituan (Zhao et al., 2024).

11 **Figure 1** describes the three parties of the OFD system—i.e., customers (yellow), merchants  
 12 (red), and drivers (blue)—interacting with each other as coordinated by a centralized platform.  
 13 We use the horizontal axis to represent time. Customers first request an order using their personal  
 14 devices, and merchants immediately start to prepare the meal upon receiving the order. Each  
 15 customer may wait for a certain time (denoted by  $W_{c,a}$ ) until the merchant accumulates a bundle  
 16 of  $k$  orders for a bundled delivery. After the merchant accumulates  $k$  orders, the orders are bundled  
 17 as a batch and are ready to be dispatched by the platform to a driver. The accumulation process is  
 18 a unique characteristic of OFD services because of order bundling. The order accumulation allows  
 19 the platform to have multiple orders consolidated as a bundle. It is worth noting that the order  
 20 accumulation process happens before matching, during which drivers are assigned an entire bundle  
 21 containing several orders. The matching process—i.e., of order bundles and vacant drivers—is  
 22 performed pair by pair and executed at the end of each matching time interval. Customers are

1 subject to  $W_{c,q}$  amount of the waiting to be matched. After order bundles are matched to vacant  
 2 drivers, drivers may spend  $W_p$  amount of time heading to pick up the meal. When drivers arrive  
 3 at the merchants, there exist two scenarios: the merchant has either completed this set of meal  
 4 bundles, which are ready for pick up, or the meals are not ready. Therefore, drivers may wait  $W_{fp}$   
 5 amount of time or experience no waiting time at the merchant’s location before they physically  
 6 collect the meals. This amount of time  $W_{fp}$  is called the waiting time due to the delay in food  
 7 preparation. Finally, drivers deliver the meals to customers sequentially and customers experience  
 8 an average  $W_{c,d}$  amount of delivery time. Similar to customers, drivers also experience a matching  
 9 time  $W_{v,q}$ , a return-pickup time  $W_p$ , and a delivery time  $W_{v,d}$ . Drivers are not subject to waiting  
 10 for accumulation because they are assigned delivery tasks after the order accumulation process,  
 11 which means that the order accumulating process should have been completed before drivers were  
 12 matched to any of the bundles.

13 To make the workflow clearer, we present two examples for customers and drivers, respectively.

14 **Example 1** (Customer). *One customer orders their food from a merchant at a time  $t_0$ . After this*  
 15 *customer finishes payment, there will be a short waiting time to wait for accumulating a bundle*  
 16 *until  $t_1$ . Then the accumulation time is  $t_1 - t_0$ . When a bundle is packed, it will be submitted*  
 17 *into the platform’s matching pool where there are multiple bundles and drivers. Then, the platform*  
 18 *performs matching using some designated algorithm to match the most suitable driver to deliver this*  
 19 *bundle. When a bundle is successfully matched with a driver at  $t_2$ , the matching process ends and*  
 20 *the matching time is  $t_2 - t_1$ . In reality, OFD apps will normally show the order status as “pending”*  
 21 *or “preparing” when the platform is performing accumulating or matching. After a driver is found,*  
 22 *the order status will be changed to “driver heading for pick up” or other similar representations*  
 23 *which vary across different platforms until the driver arrives at the restaurant at time  $t_3$ . If the*  
 24 *meal is ready, the driver will collect the meal and start delivery and wait otherwise until  $t_4$ . In*  
 25 *other words, if there is no waiting time for food preparation,  $t_4 = t_3$ , and if there is,  $t_4 > t_3$ . The*  
 26 *food preparation time is thus  $\max(t_4 - t_3, 0)$ . Finally, the customer waits for the food until it is*  
 27 *delivered on time  $t_5$  and the customer delivery time is  $t_5 - t_4$ .*

28 **Example 2** (Driver). *One driver may start their status from “vacant” status on  $T_0$  which means*  
 29 *they are waiting to be matched. If the market presents a situation where there are more vacant*  
 30 *drivers than needed (which is termed as “supply-dominated” situation, see [Section 4.1.1](#) for details),*  
 31 *drivers typically need to wait to be matched for a longer time than customers need to (because to*  
 32 *maintain a certain service level, platforms usually keep the number of vacant drivers more than*  
 33 *number of customer bundles). After being matched on time  $T_1$  (matching time is  $T_1 - T_0$ ), the*  
 34 *driver is assigned a bundle of orders and heads to the restaurant for pickup. After the driver*  
 35 *arrives at the restaurant on time  $T_2$  (pickup time is  $T_2 - T_1$ ), similarly, depending on whether the*  
 36 *meal is ready or not, the driver collects the meal at  $T_3$  which can be  $T_3 > T_2$  if the meal is not ready*  
 37 *or  $T_3 = T_2$  if the meal is ready to go. The waiting time for food preparation is  $\max(T_3 - T_2, 0)$ .*  
 38 *Then, the driver delivers all the orders and completes delivery at  $T_4$ , and the driver delivery time*  
 39 *is  $T_4 - T_3$ . Since the driver needs to deliver all the orders in the bundle, the driver delivery time is*  
 40 *greater than the customer delivery time.*

41 As shown in [Figure 1](#), customers may experience  $W_{c,a}$ , which represents customers’ order accu-  
 42 mulation time,  $W_{c,q}$  customers’ matching time,  $W_p$  return-pickup time,  $W_{fp}$  food preparation time,  
 43 and  $W_{c,d}$  customers’ delivery time. Food delivery drivers may experience  $W_{v,q}$ , which represents  
 44 driver matching time,  $W_p$  return-pickup time,  $W_{fp}$  food preparation time, and  $W_{v,d}$  the driver  
 45 delivery time. Let  $W_c$  and  $W_v$  be the total waiting time experienced by customers and the total

1 time experienced by drivers, respectively. They can be expressed in Equation (1) and Equation (2)  
 2 as follows:

$$3 \quad W_c = W_{c,q} + W_{c,d} + W_p + W_{fp} + W_{c,a}, \quad (1)$$

$$4 \quad W_v = W_{v,q} + W_{v,d} + W_p + W_{fp}. \quad (2)$$

## 5 3.2 Customer demand

6 Customer demand for each merchant  $i$  follows a demand density rate  $\delta_i(r)$  in the unit of [order/(km<sup>2</sup>·  
 7 hour)], which is a function of the distance from the customer to the selected merchant  $r$ . We per-  
 8 ceive restaurants as either a single restaurant or potentially being clusters of restaurants, similar  
 9 to a food court or a shopping mall where restaurants are in close proximity such that the trav-  
 10 eling time between restaurants is negligible. This viewpoint aligns more closely with reality and  
 11 practically facilitates the process of order bundling. Nonetheless, to avoid confusion, we continue  
 12 to refer to these entities simply as a “merchant” or “restaurant”. In many North American cities,  
 13 food courts or business areas often house multiple restaurants within the same urban plaza. Given  
 14 that the meals are prepared and ready for delivery, the travel time between these restaurants is  
 15 negligible. Similarly, in East Asia, shopping malls located in urban areas frequently feature numer-  
 16 ous restaurants operating on the lower ground floor. This arrangement is particularly convenient  
 17 for delivery drivers. Consequently, the density of such food courts or shopping malls should not be  
 18 very high. Also, we consider independent customer demand for merchants under the assumption  
 19 that the restaurant clusters are not very densely distributed. In other words, customers preferring  
 20 one restaurant do not necessarily prefer another. This reflects a scenario where each merchant  
 21 serves a distinct customer base, simplifying the model while allowing the analysis of individual  
 22 merchant behavior. This assumption avoids complexities related to inter-merchant interactions,  
 23 ensuring analytical tractability and enabling general insights into system performance. While this  
 24 excludes interdependencies, such as geographic proximity or merchant competition, these could be  
 25 addressed in future work with a more detailed model. By combining this assumption with a uni-  
 26 form customer distribution around each merchant, the model remains focused on key operational  
 27 features while staying analytically manageable. The demand density rate can take various forms;  
 28 for instance, decreasing with  $r$ , or first increasing and then decreasing with  $r$ . Using the demand  
 29 density rate, the realized customer demand of all merchants is computed as the summation of all  
 30 individual merchants:

$$31 \quad q = \sum_{i=1}^M \int_0^R \delta_i(r) 2\pi r dr. \quad (3)$$

32 In the model property part of this paper, for the sake of analytical tractability, we base our  
 33 analysis on the assumption of homogeneous customer demand for each merchant, which is helpful  
 34 in generating valuable insights using the model. In practice, this assumption can be relaxed and  
 35 the value of  $\delta_i(r)$  can be calibrated using real data.

## 36 3.3 Waiting times

### 37 3.3.1 Order accumulation time

38 The average customer’s order accumulation time is computed as the time for the  $k^{th}$  order’s arrival  
 39 divided by 2 to consider the average between the luckiest (the customer enters the market as the

1  $k^{th}$  order and does not need to wait) and the worst case (the customer enters the market as the  
 2 1st order and must wait to accumulate  $k - 1$  orders) for each customer when they order foods from  
 3 merchants. Let  $\bar{N}_w$  be the average number of working drivers during equilibrium and thus  $q/\bar{N}_w$  is  
 4 the average service rate for each working driver (equivalently for each bundle because each working  
 5 driver should carry one bundle). Then, the customer's average accumulation time is

$$6 \quad W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2\left(q/\bar{N}_w\right)}. \quad (4)$$

### 8 3.3.2 Matching time

9 Customers' and driver expected matching times are expressed as follows:

$$10 \quad W_{c,q} = \frac{1}{2}\tau p_c + \frac{3}{2}\tau p_c(1-p_c) + \frac{5}{2}\tau p_c(1-p_c)^2 + \dots = \tau \left( \frac{1}{p_c} - \frac{1}{2} \right), \quad (5)$$


$$11 \quad W_{v,q} = \frac{1}{2}\tau p_v + \frac{3}{2}\tau p_v(1-p_v) + \frac{5}{2}\tau p_v(1-p_v)^2 + \dots = \tau \left( \frac{1}{p_v} - \frac{1}{2} \right), \quad (6)$$

12 where  $p_c$  or  $p_v$  are the probabilities of each bundle of customers or each driver being successfully  
 13 matched within each match time interval, respectively, and we assume that the customers and  
 14 drivers follow a uniform arrival rate and this rate is large enough relative to the matching time  
 15 interval, which makes it possible to approximate the arrival processes as a (deterministic) fluid  
 16 model (Shortie et al., 2018, pp 392). Equations (5) and (6) show that the matching time is the  
 17 expected value (sum of probability multiplied by outcome) of being matched on each matching  
 18 interval.

19 The matching probabilities are distinct in two scenarios, the supply-dominant (SD) scenario  
 20 and the demand-dominant (DD) scenario. The division of the two scenarios is based on the relative  
 21 relationship between the number of vacant drivers  $N_v$  and the number of order bundles  $N_b$  at the  
 22 end of each matching interval. We will provide a formal definition and differentiation criteria in  
 23 Section 4. In a supply-dominant scenario,  $N_v$  exceeds  $N_b$  and thus all order bundles are guaranteed  
 24 a match with certain drivers. Consequently, the probability of a customer match, denoted as  $p_c$ ,  
 25 is 1 (i.e.,  $p_c = 1$ ). Under this circumstance, driver matching probability, denoted as  $p_v$ , equals  
 26  $N_b/N_v$ . This is calculated by the principle of conservation between matched drivers and order  
 27 bundles  $p_v N_v = p_c N_b$ . In contrast, in the demand-dominated scenario, we have  $N_v < N_b$ . Then,  
 28 all the vacant drivers are matched and  $p_v = 1$ , resulting in the customer's matching probability  
 29  $p_c = N_v/N_b$ . With these two scenarios defined, we know that the number of matched drivers for  
 30 each matching interval (and equivalently, the number of matched order bundles) is  $\min(N_b, N_v)$ .

### 31 3.3.3 Delivery and return-pickup time

32 Delivery behavior under order bundling is an essential part of the modeling process. Insights from  
 33 the literature argue that the delivery process in the OFD market is highly dependent on the driver's  
 34 local knowledge and experience (Mao et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2021; Mao et al., 2022; Carlsson et al.  
 35 (2024)). As a result, we assume that drivers serve for a specific region and exclude the driver  
 36 repositioning process. This assumption can be justified by the practice in the real world, where  
 37 OFD platforms often restrict the service region for drivers to ensure efficient and reliable services  
 38 (e.g., Uber Eats' "delivery zone" (Uber Technologies Inc., 2025)).



**Figure 2:** Delivery and return-pickup routing approximations. Red lines represent the approximated delivery route and wavy blue lines represent the approximated return-pickup route. Black stars represent customers’ locations, and the black dot in the center is the location of the merchant.

1 We adopt continuum approximation to calculate the delivery and return-pickup length, similar  
2 to the approaches by Wang and Odoni (2016), Chen and Wang (2018), Bahrami et al. (2023), and  
3 Ke et al. (2024). Delivery and pickup routes are assumed to be in one trip, and route lengths  
4 are denoted as  $L_d$  and  $L_p$  for delivery and return-pickup routes respectively. Figure 2 depicts the  
5 approximations of delivery and return-pickup schemes. The routing indicates that drivers deliver  
6 the first half of customers. Afterward, they return to the merchant while simultaneously delivering  
7 the remaining half of the customers. Simulation experiments also validate the return behavior in  
8 Figure 2 that under a general VRP without returning (also called open-VRP) problem, the last  
9 drop-off destination will be closer than the farthest delivery destination (Appendix C). The sim-  
10 ulation experiment indicates that on average, drivers will follow a return-like route, and enhance  
11 the applicability of our approximation in Figure 2. Also, if we consider a uniform distribution  
12 of restaurants across the space, we can assume that drivers would stay at their last delivery des-  
13 tination after the completion of a bundle delivery. On the one hand, since the restaurants are  
14 uniformly distributed, drivers do not have the preference of which restaurant to go to, and they  
15 would decide to stay at the last drop-off location. On the other hand, this approach is a modeling  
16 tool to ensure fair comparison between different strategies and maintain analytical tractability.  
17 Under the assumption that restaurant distribution is sparse (Section 3.2), we can just consider the  
18 matching result that drivers will ultimately be matched to the original restaurant. The continuum  
19 approximation technique allows us to deal with uncertain delivery points and calculate the average  
20 delivery distance with continuous  $R$  and  $k$ . This adopted approximation scheme might not be the  
21 most accurate but it reflects the most important impact of both the maximum delivery distance  
22 and the bundling ratio, i.e., the relative position and number of detours needed to be made.

23 The delivery area of a merchant is assumed to be a circular disk and can be divided into several  
24 sectors (Bahrami et al., 2023), each of which is the individual delivery area of one driver. This is  
25 interpreted as the platform assigning a suitable area (which can be narrow or wide) to each driver—  
26 and thus an optimized visiting sequence of orders—to improve delivery efficiency. In practice, even  
27 though it is possible that there are overlapping delivery areas among different drivers, the platform  
28 can partition the region and optimize the routing of each driver (e.g., Carlsson et al. (2024)) to  
29 avoid overlapping (if two routes are overlapped, orders in one route can be simply switched to  
30 another driver which reduces detour). We also assume that the driver fleet size is greater than the  
31 number of merchants,  $N > M$ , to ensure that there will always be at least one driver on average  
32 serving each merchant. If customer demand is high, each driver will be in charge of a narrow sector

1 because the number of customers in this narrow sector can reach the bundling ratio  $k$ . In contrast,  
 2 for low demand, each driver's individual delivery area will be wide (the inner angle is large) because  
 3 customers are distributed sparsely. The inner angle of each of the sectors is denoted as  $2\theta$ , and  $2\theta$   
 4 is given by  $2\pi$  divided by the average number of working drivers per merchant under equilibrium.  
 5 The inner angle thus needs to satisfy the condition that  $\theta < \pi$ , meaning that each food delivery  
 6 driver serves a delivery area of at most one merchant. An inner angle  $\theta$  greater than  $\pi$  represents  
 7 that the food delivery supply from each individual driver has exceeded the food delivery demand of  
 8 a single merchant, indicating that the food delivery demand is too small. This scenario is regarded  
 9 as invalid in this study. Let the average total number of working drivers in each matching interval  
 10 be denoted as  $\bar{N}_w$ ; this inner angle is computed by

$$11 \quad 2\theta = \frac{2\pi}{\bar{N}_w/M} = \frac{2\pi M}{\bar{N}_w}, \quad (7)$$

12 where the average number of working drivers  $\bar{N}_w$  is divided by  $M$  to represent the average number  
 13 of working drivers serving each merchant.

14 Delivery distance consists of a transverse part ( $L_t$ ) and an axial part ( $L_a$ ). Using the contin-  
 15 uum approximation (CA) method, following Newell and Daganzo (1986), Jabali et al. (2012), and  
 16 Bahrami et al. (2023), the average transverse (tangential) travel distance of a driver who is  $r$  away  
 17 from the merchant is  $l_r = r\theta/3$ . The probability  $p_r$  of each customer's appearing between radius  $r$   
 18 and  $r + dr$  for each merchant is  $p_r = 2\pi r dr \delta_i(r)/q_i$ , where  $q_i$  is the realized customer demand rate  
 19 of merchant  $i$ . Then the expected transverse distance of each driver is

$$20 \quad l_t = \int_{r=0}^{r=R} p_r l_r = \int_0^R \frac{2\pi r^2 \theta \delta_i(r)}{3q_i} dr. \quad (8)$$

21 The driver will transversely travel on average  $k$  times because they will visit  $k$  customers on  
 22 average (we consider CA and treat  $k$  as a continuous variable for approximation purpose), and thus  
 23 the total transverse distance is

$$24 \quad L_t = k l_t. \quad (9)$$

25 Meanwhile, each driver also needs to travel an axial distance from the center to the outskirts  
 26 of the delivery area (excluding the return-pickup distance):

$$27 \quad L_a = 2R - L_p, \quad (10)$$

28 where  $L_p$  denotes the return-pickup distance. We formulate the return-pickup distance as a fraction  
 29 of the maximum delivery distance divided by the number of orders in each half-sector, or interpret  
 30 it as a fraction of the average axial spacing between each customer on one side of the sector (shown  
 31 as the blue line with an arrow in Figure 2):

$$32 \quad L_p = \eta \frac{R}{k/2} = \frac{2R\eta}{k}, \quad (11)$$

33 where  $\eta$  is a coefficient, which is dependent on the demand profile and can be estimated using  
 34 real-world data and also used to calibrate the return-pickup length of drivers. Considering  $\eta$  is just  
 35 an exogenous coefficient, we take the value  $\eta = 1$  in the modeling solution to maintain a neat and  
 36 interpretable form of analytical results.

1 Finally, driver delivery time and return-pickup time are the delivery distance and return-pickup  
 2 distance divided by the average speed (assumed to be a constant,  $v$ ), which gives<sup>1</sup>

$$3 \quad W_{v,d} = \frac{L_d}{v} = \frac{L_t + L_a}{v} = \frac{1}{v} \left( 2R + k \int_0^R \frac{2\pi r^2 \theta \delta_i(r)}{3q_i} dr - L_p \right), \quad (12)$$

$$4 \quad W_p = \frac{L_p}{v} = \frac{2R\eta}{kv}. \quad (13)$$

5 For each customer, the average delivery time is the sum of the delivery time for all customers  
 6 divided by  $k$ . The delivery distance for the  $n^{\text{th}}$  customer depends on which half of the sector the  
 7 customer is in. Readers are referred to the left-hand side of [Figure 2](#) for an illustration. The  
 8 formulation is

$$9 \quad W_{c,d,n} = \begin{cases} nL_p + (n-1)l_t, & n \leq \frac{k}{2}, \\ (n-1)L_p + nl_t, & n > \frac{k}{2}. \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

10 Then, the average customer delivery time is computed as (see proof in [Appendix A](#))

$$11 \quad W_{c,d} = \frac{L_p + L_d + 2R(\eta - 1)}{2v}. \quad (15)$$

### 13 3.3.4 Waiting time due to food preparation


14 Within the merchant's operations, there is a capacity limit for the food preparation rate, which  
 15 leads to a potential scenario in which drivers may arrive at the merchant but have to wait until all  
 16 meals in a bundle are ready. This waiting time, denoted  $W_{fp}$ , should adhere to the condition that  
 17 the order arrival rate amortized on each merchant,  $q/M$ , does not exceed the food preparation rate,  
 18  $1/\tau_M$  (i.e.,  $q/M \leq 1/\tau_M$ ) where  $\tau_M$  denotes the average time to complete one order of food. This  
 19 constraint is essential to avoid an over-saturated demand that prevents the system from reaching  
 20 a steady state.

21 To ensure efficient order processing, each merchant initiates meal preparation immediately  
 22 upon receiving an order. Once the last customer in a bundle places an order, successfully com-  
 23 pleting the bundle, the platform will promptly call for drivers to pick up the bundle (i.e., initiating  
 24 matching). Simultaneously, the restaurant will start cooking the last meal.

25 On the platform's side, there are matching times experienced by customers  $W_{c,q}$  and the return-  
 26 pickup time  $W_p$ , which contiguously happen after the order request of the last customer in a bundle.  
 27 Therefore, it takes  $W_{c,q} + W_p$  in total from the start time of the call for matching to the time the  
 28 assigned driver arrives at the restaurant. On the restaurant's side, the meal is being prepared with  
 29 an average time  $\tau_M$  for the merchant to finish. We can approximate the order arrival-preparation  
 30 process as a fluid model (Shortie et al., 2018, pp 392) for the derivation of analytical insights.  
 31 Therefore,  $W_{fp}$  is calculated from the difference between  $\tau_M$  and  $W_{c,q} + W_p$ . Also, it should be  
 32 non-negative, which gives rise to

$$33 \quad W_{fp} = \max(\tau_M - W_{c,q} - W_p, 0). \quad (16)$$

<sup>1</sup>We acknowledge that the following equations are based on approximation techniques, which might generate some bias. Our use of these approximations is for illustrative purposes with closed-form solutions and valuable analytic insights.



**Figure 3:** Illustration of the system under equilibrium.  $N_v$  and  $N_s$  are the numbers of drivers who are awaiting matching and meal preparation respectively.

### 1 3.4 Equilibrium conditions

2 In the steady state of the system (equilibrium), all customer demand is satisfied with market  
 3 clearing (Yang et al., 2010, Yang and Yang, 2011) achieved based on the following conditions.  
 4 First, regarding the matching equilibrium, realized bundle-wise customer demand rate  $q/k$  should  
 5 be equal to the matching rate  $\lambda_0$  (it is also the rate at which drivers transfer from the vacant status  
 6 to the working status). Second, regarding the self-consistency of the transfer rate between working  
 7 drivers and vacant drivers, the matching rate  $\lambda_0$  should be equal to the rate at which working  
 8 drivers transfer to vacant drivers  $\lambda$ :

$$9 \quad q/k = \lambda_0, \quad (17)$$

$$10 \quad \lambda_0 = \lambda. \quad (18)$$

11 Through these two equations, we obtain the equality condition that  $q/k = \lambda$ . Since customers  
 12 order food online and induce traffic, we treat it as demand for the movement of meals, termed  
 13 *food delivery demand (rate)*. In contrast, the pickup-delivery process, which transports meals from  
 14 merchants to customers, can be considered to be supply for the movement of meals; thus we call  
 15 it *food delivery supply (rate)*. Note that food delivery demand (or supply) here is not the same  
 16 concept used to define the DD (or SD) scenario, in which the former is a rate while the latter is  
 17 a quantity (mass). Then, the equality condition  $q/k = \lambda$  is interpreted as the food delivery supply  
 18 meeting the food delivery demand.

19 **Figure 3** illustrates the equilibrium process of the OFD market, in which on the left customer  
 20 demand flows into the system at a rate of  $q$ , and on the right delivery drivers are moving meals out  
 21 of the system to customers at a rate of  $\lambda$ . Within the system, shaded in blue, customer demand  
 22 rate  $q/k$  and vacant driver arrival rate  $\lambda$  are both equal to the matching rate  $\lambda_0$ .

23 According to our discussion in **Section 3.3.2**, the number of matched vacant drivers (or equiv-  
 24 alently, the number of matched bundles) is equal to  $\min(N_b, N_v)$ . Since the matching time interval  
 25 is  $\tau$ , the matching rate is  $\lambda_0 = \min(N_b, N_v)/\tau$ . Vacant drivers are subject to  $W_{v,q}$ —the waiting  
 26 time to be matched—where  $W_{v,q} = \tau(1/p_v - 1/2)$  (see **Section 3.3.2**). Since  $p_v N_v = p_c N_b$ , we have  
 27  $W_{v,q} = \tau(N_v/N_b - 1/2)$  if  $N_v \geq N_b$  and  $W_{v,q} = \tau/2$  if  $N_v < N_b$ . For  $N_v \geq N_b$ , we have

$$28 \quad W_{v,q} = \tau \left( \frac{N_v}{N_b} - \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{N_v}{N_b/\tau} - \frac{\tau}{2} = \frac{N_v}{\lambda_0} - \frac{\tau}{2}. \quad (19)$$

29 Rearranging **Equation (19)**, we obtain

$$30 \quad N_v = \lambda_0 \left( W_{v,q} + \frac{\tau}{2} \right). \quad (20)$$

1 Similarly,  $N_b = \lambda_0 (W_{c,q} + \tau/2)$  can also be derived from Equation (5). Apart from the matching  
 2 equilibrium, we have another condition: vehicle conservation. We hold the assumption of a constant  
 3 vehicle fleet size because our primary emphasis is the influence of the service region and the bundling  
 4 ratio; examination of the behavior of the fleet size is reserved for future work. Then we have

$$5 \quad N = \lambda W_v = \lambda (W_{v,q} + W_p + W_{fp} + W_{v,d}). \quad (21)$$

6 Combining Equations (18), (20) and (21), we obtain the following condition regarding the rate  
 7 of the working drivers:

$$8 \quad N - N_v = \lambda \left( W_p + W_{fp} + W_{v,d} - \frac{\tau}{2} \right). \quad (22)$$

9 Finally, with food delivery demand-supply equality  $q/k = \lambda$ , Equation (20), and Equation (22),  
 10 we define the equilibrium of the OFD market below.

11 **Definition 1.** For an OFD market, the matching between order bundles and vacant drivers, as  
 12 well as the food delivery demand-supply, are considered to achieve a stationary equilibrium state  
 13 and there is market clearing if the following conditions hold.

$$14 \quad \frac{q}{k} = \frac{N_v}{W_{v,q} + \frac{\tau}{2}} \quad (\text{demand-matching equilibrium}), \quad (23a)$$

$$15 \quad \frac{q}{k} = \frac{N - N_v}{W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp} - \frac{\tau}{2}} \quad (\text{demand-supply equilibrium}). \quad (23b)$$

16

17 It should be satisfied that the number of vacant drivers and the number of order bundles  
 18 should be greater than the number of matched drivers/bundles in each matching interval,  $\lambda\tau$ —i.e.,  
 19  $N_b \geq \lambda\tau, N_v \geq \lambda\tau$ . This equilibrium model has two degrees of freedom,  $N_v$  and  $N_b$ ; once they are  
 20 fixed, the system, as well as its endogenous variables, are all determined. Therefore, we treat  $N_v$   
 21 and  $N_b$  as two unknown variables and solve them using the equilibrium conditions.

## 22 4 Model solution and properties

23 We treat  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  as two unknown variables, as described in the previous section. The model  
 24 solution is defined as follows.

25 **Definition 2.** The model solution is the set of  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  such that the equilibrium conditions in  
 26 Equation (23) are satisfied under a given set of decision variables, i.e.,  $R$  and  $k$ .

27 Since we adopt CA to approximate the delivery and pickup distances, their detailed expressions  
 28 are dependent on the customer demand profile  $\delta(r)$ ; model solutions also are.  $\delta(r)$  can take various  
 29 forms in different geographic locations and at different times. For the sake of deriving analytical  
 30 insights, we specify this demand profile to be uniform across the space, which is defined as follows:

$$31 \quad \delta(r) = \begin{cases} \frac{\bar{q}}{M\pi R_a^2}, & r \leq R_a, \\ 0, & r > R_a, \end{cases} \quad (24)$$

1 where  $\bar{q}$  denotes the potential customer demand over the entire region,  $M$  denotes the number  
 2 of merchants, and  $R_a$  is the radius of the merchant’s attractive region beyond which there is no  
 3 demand. We assume in a tactical operation, which has impact on market performance but not  
 4 yet on long-term effects such as customer complaints and demand decrease. We also assume that  
 5 customer demand is homogeneous for analytical tractability and thereby all merchants share the  
 6 same demand density rate  $\delta$ ; this assumption can be relaxed if real data on customer demand  
 7 is known. We consider  $\eta = 1$  in the model solution and properties for illustrative purposes for a  
 8 neat representation of analytical results, which also facilitates the development of analysis. Despite  
 9 adopting these assumptions in the model’s solutions and properties, we demonstrate numerical  
 10 results in the appendix (see discussion in Appendix B), where we consider different demand density  
 11 rates and the stochasticity of customer’s arrival to food preparation rate, respectively.

#### 12 4.1 Existence of the solutions and four scenarios for the OFD market

13 The existence of the equilibrium solution depends on whether the system can reach an equilibrium  
 14 state—i.e., whether the food delivery supply can meet the food delivery demand. We define the  
 15 system with an equilibrium solution as a stable system. In a stable system, since the food delivery  
 16 supply is sufficient, all realized customer demand  $q$  can be served. In contrast, not all of  $q$  can be  
 17 satisfied in an unstable system, which is not desired and it may produce a large amount of waiting  
 18 time for customers.

19 **Insights of  $R$  and  $k$  into the existence of the equilibrium solution.** Given the maximum  
 20 delivery distance  $R$ , a small bundling ratio  $k$  may risk the OFD system’s being unstable due to  
 21 insufficient delivery supply. On the other hand, given  $k$ , a large  $R$  may risk the OFD system’s  
 22 being unstable due to excessive customer demand.

23  $R$  represents the maximum delivery distance and can eliminate some customer demand outside  
 24 the delivery area of a merchant. Therefore, a large  $R$  will cover a large customer demand and thus  
 25 a large demand for transporting meals from the merchant to customers. The bundling ratio  $k$   
 26 reveals how many orders each driver carries on each delivery, and hence contributes positively to  
 27 the delivery supply. If  $k$  is not sufficiently large, a system may be subject to the risk that the food  
 28 delivery supply cannot meet the food delivery demand. Consequently, there is a bundling ratio  
 29 threshold  $k_c$  for any given  $R$  in order to achieve system stability. The existence condition of the  
 30 system equilibrium is defined as follows (see the expression of  $k_c$  in Appendix D).

31 **Lemma 1 (Existence condition).** *Given  $R$ , the equilibrium solution of the system exists if  $k \geq k_c$ ,*  
 32 *where  $k_c$  is a function of  $R$ —i.e.,  $k_c = k_c(R)$ —and we have  $\frac{\partial k_c}{\partial R} > 0$ .*

33 *Proof.* See Appendix D. □

34 We focus on the effects from  $R$  and  $k$  which reflect the size of the service region and the number  
 35 of orders each driver carries because according to our results in Tables 2 to 4. In other words, we  
 36 analyze the system and discuss the properties in the two-dimensional coordinate space of  $R$  and  $k$ :

$$37 \quad \mathcal{S} = \{(R, k) | R \geq 0, k \geq 2\}. \quad (25)$$

38 Let  $\mathcal{L}_e \subset \mathcal{S}$  represent the relationship between  $R$  and  $k$  of  $k_c$ ,  $\mathcal{L}_e$  serves as the boundary curve  
 39 in  $\mathcal{S}$  for the system to be stable. We have  $\mathcal{L}_e = \{(R, k) | N_v = \lambda\tau \text{ and } W_{fp} = 0\}$  where the subscript  
 40  $e$  stands for *equilibrium*.

1 **4.1.1 Four scenarios for the OFD market**

2 We differentiate the OFD market into four distinct scenarios, based on two criteria. The first con-  
 3 cerns the food delivery supply–demand relationship, which is based on whether  $N_b > N_v$  (demand-  
 4 dominant, DD) or otherwise (supply-dominant, SD). The second criterion concerns whether food  
 5 delivery drivers have to wait at the restaurant for meal preparation when they arrive at the restau-  
 6 rant, depending on whether  $W_{fp} = 0$  (ready-for-pickup, RP) or not (wait-for-pickup, WP).

7 Let  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP} \subset \mathcal{S}$  be the boundary curve that separates the decision space of the RP scenario  
 8 and the WP scenario, and  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD} \subset \mathcal{S}$  be the boundary curve that separates the decision space of  
 9 the SD scenario and the DD scenario, we obtain the following property.

10 **Lemma 2.** *The model solution is continuous at any point on  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$  and on  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$ .*

11 *Proof.* See Appendix E. □

12 **The criterion of whether  $N_b$  is greater than  $N_v$ .** Since the SD scenario and the DD scenario  
 13 are differentiated by the relative value of  $N_b$  and  $N_v$ , as discussed in Section 3.3.2, the critical con-  
 14 dition for the SD scenario and the DD scenario is  $N_b = N_v$ . Substituting  $N_b = N_v$  in Equation (23),  
 15 we obtain

16 
$$N_b = N_v = \lambda\tau, \tag{26}$$

17 
$$\frac{N}{\lambda} - \frac{\tau}{2} = (W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp})|_{N_b = N_v = \lambda\tau}. \tag{27}$$

18 Simplifying Equation (27) yields  $\Delta_c(R, k) = 0$ , where  $\Delta_c(R, k)$  is a function of decision variables  
 19  $R$  and  $k$ , and it only depends on exogenous variables (see its formulation in Appendix F). We  
 20 then introduce the criterion for differentiating SD and DD scenarios—the demand-supply mass  
 21 relationship (DSMR) criterion based on  $\Delta_c(R, k)$ , as follows (see the expression of  $\Delta_c$  in Appendix  
 22 F).

23 **Lemma 3 (DSMR criterion).** *For a stable system satisfying Lemma 1, the system is considered*  
 24 *to be under the SD scenario if the condition  $\Delta_c(R, k) \leq 0$  is satisfied; otherwise, it is considered to*  
 25 *be under the DD scenario.  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$  corresponds to  $\Delta_c(R, k) = 0$ .*

26 *Proof.* See Appendix F. □

27 Also, the boundary curve  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD} \subset \mathcal{S}$  has the following property.

28 **Lemma 4.** *In the  $R$ - $k$  coordinate system of  $\mathcal{S}$ , the boundary curve  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$  has a slope greater*  
 29 *than 0, i.e.,  $\frac{dR}{dk} > 0$ .*

30 *Proof.* See Appendix G. □

31 **The criterion of whether drivers need to wait for food preparation.** The RP scenario and  
 32 the WP scenario are differentiated based on whether  $W_{fp} = 0$ , i.e., whether  $\tau_M - W_p - W_{c,q} \leq 0$ .  
 33 Then, given that  $k_c$  (see its expression in Appendix Section D) is the critical  $k$  to make the  
 34 equilibrium exist, we have the following RPWP criterion.

1 **Lemma 5 (RPWP criterion).** For an OFD system under the SD scenario given by Lemma 3, if  
 2 the condition  $\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} \leq 0$  is satisfied, the system is under the RP scenario. Otherwise, the  
 3 system is under the WP scenario. For an OFD system under the DD scenario given by Lemma 3,  
 4 the system is under the RP scenario if  $k = k_c(R)$  and under the WP scenario if  $k > k_c(R)$ .

5 *Proof.* See Appendix H. □

6 With the DSMR criterion defined in Lemma 3 and the RPWP criterion defined in Lemma 5,  
 7 the OFD system is now categorized into four scenarios: the RP-SD scenario, WP-SD scenario,  
 8 RP-DD scenario, and WP-DD scenario. Remarkably, since the existence condition requires that  
 9  $N_v + \lambda W_{fp} \geq \lambda\tau$ , which results in the critical condition's being  $N_v = \lambda\tau$  and  $W_{fp} = 0$ , the condition  
 10  $N_v = \lambda\tau$  for the system under the RP scenario is equivalent to the condition  $\tau_M - W_P - W_{c,q}$  for the  
 11 system under the DD scenario. We provide equilibrium solutions and analyses of these scenarios  
 12 in the next section.

## 13 4.2 Equilibrium solutions

14 This section provides the closed-form solution for the two intermediate unknown variables,  $N_b$  and  
 15  $N_v$ , using the equilibrium conditions in Equation (23):

$$16 \quad \frac{q}{k} = \frac{N_v}{W_{v,q} + \frac{\tau}{2}},$$

$$17 \quad \frac{q}{k} = \frac{N - N_v}{W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp} - \frac{\tau}{2}}.$$

18 The problem has distinct formulations for each scenario—the RP-SD scenario, WP-SD sce-  
 19 nario, RP-DD scenario, and WP-DD scenario.

20 **The RP-SD scenario.** If the system is subject to decision variables that cause the system to be  
 21 under the RP-SD scenario according to the criteria in Lemma 3 and Lemma 5, we have  $N_v \geq N_b$   
 22 and  $\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} \leq 0$ . Then the equilibrium solutions for  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  are

$$23 \quad N_v = \underbrace{N}_{\text{Fleet size}} - \overbrace{\frac{6Rq - 3q\tau v + 2\sqrt{2\pi MRk^2qv + 9R^2q^2}}{6kv}}^{\text{Average \# of return-pickup and delivery drivers}}, \quad (28)$$

$$24 \quad N_b = \frac{q}{k}\tau. \quad (29)$$

25 Equation (28) also tells that the average number of working drivers  $\bar{N}_w = N - N_v + \lambda_0\tau/2 =$   
 26  $\frac{Rq}{kv} + \sqrt{\frac{2\pi MRq}{9v} + \left(\frac{Rq}{kv}\right)^2}$ , influenced by the number of drivers on their delivery and return-pickup  
 27 routes.

1 **The WP-SD scenario.** If the system is subject to decision variables that cause the system to be  
 2 under the WP-SD scenario according to the criteria in [Lemma 3](#) and [Lemma 5](#), we have  $N_v \geq N_b$   
 3 and  $\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} > 0$ . Then the equilibrium solutions for  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  are

$$4 \quad N_v = \underbrace{\text{Fleet size}}_N - \frac{\text{Average \# of return-pickup, delivery, and awaiting (for meal preparation) drivers}}{6kv} = \frac{6R_s q - 3q\tau v + 2\sqrt{2\pi MRk^2 qv + 9R_s^2 q^2}}{6kv}, \quad (30)$$

$$5 \quad N_b = \frac{q}{k}\tau, \quad (31)$$

6 where  $R_s = R + W_{fp}v/2$ . Similar to the RP-SD scenario, from [Equation \(30\)](#) we know the average  
 7 number of working drivers  $\bar{N}_w = \frac{R_s q}{kv} + \sqrt{\frac{2\pi MRq}{9v} + \left(\frac{R_s q}{kv}\right)^2}$ , influenced by the number of drivers  
 8 on their delivery and return-pickup routes.

9 **The RP-DD scenario.** If the system is subject to decision variables that cause the system to  
 10 be under the RP-SD scenario according to the criteria in [Lemma 3](#) and [Lemma 5](#), we have  $N_v < N_b$   
 11 and  $k = k_c(R)$ . Then the equilibrium solutions for  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  are

$$12 \quad N_v = \underbrace{\text{Fleet size}}_N - \frac{\text{Average \# of return-pickup and delivery drivers}}{6kv} = \frac{6Rq - 3q\tau v + 2\sqrt{2\pi MRk^2 qv + 9R^2 q^2}}{6kv} = \frac{q}{k}\tau, \quad (32)$$

$$13 \quad \underbrace{N_b}_{\text{Part of the \# of drivers awaiting food preparation}} = \underbrace{\frac{q}{k}\left(\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} + \frac{\tau}{2}\right)}_{\text{Remainder terms of the \# of drivers awaiting food preparation}}, \quad (33)$$


14 where [Equation \(33\)](#) means that the food preparation time should be exactly equal to the pickup  
 15 time and customers' matching time. This equation renders the RP-DD scenario a special case of  
 16 the WP-DD scenario (the waiting time for food preparation is 0).

17 **The WP-DD scenario.** If the system is subject to decision variables that cause the system to  
 18 be under the WP-DD scenario according to the criteria in [Lemma 3](#) and [Lemma 5](#), we have  $N_v < N_b$   
 19 and  $k > k_c(R)$ . Then the equilibrium solutions for  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  are

$$20 \quad N_v = \frac{q}{k}\tau, \quad (34)$$

$$21 \quad \underbrace{N_b}_{\text{Part of the \# of drivers awaiting food preparation}} = \underbrace{\frac{4\pi MRkq}{18Nkv - 9q\tau v} + \frac{2R}{v} \cdot \frac{q}{k}}_{\text{\# of return-pickup and delivery drivers}} - \underbrace{\left(N - \frac{q\tau}{2k}\right)}_{\text{Average \# of working drivers}} \quad (35)$$

$$+ \underbrace{\frac{q}{k}\left(\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} + \frac{\tau}{2}\right)}_{\text{Remainder terms of the \# of drivers awaiting food preparation}}.$$



**Figure 4:** Diagram for the division of the different scenarios. The “invalid region” (refer to Section 3.3.3) corresponds to  $\theta > \pi$  and falls outside the scope of this study.

1 Equation (32) of the RP-DD is on the boundary curve  $\mathcal{L}_e$ , as previously in Lemma 5 (we  
 2 can also validate the solution of  $N_b$  by substituting  $k = k_c$  in Equation (35) and then obtain  
 3 Equation (33)). It is also intuitively true that if there are drivers awaiting, demand should not be  
 4 dominated because there is still unused delivery supply in the system. For brevity, we combine the  
 5 RP-DD scenario and the WP-DD scenario to be the DD scenario and analyze them as a whole.

### 6 4.3 Uniqueness of the solution

7 We next discuss the uniqueness of the equilibrium solutions. We know from Lemma 3 and Lemma 5  
 8 that the separation curves  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$  and  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$  are exclusively dependent on the decision variables  
 9 under certain exogenous variables, which indicates that there is no overlapped region between  
 10 the RP and WP scenarios, or between the SD and DD scenarios. We then have the following  
 11 proposition.

12 **Proposition 1.** *Given a set of certain decision variables  $(R, k)$ , the equilibrium solution of the*  
 13 *OFD system is unique if the existence condition in Lemma 1 is met and the regions of the RP-SD*  
 14 *scenario, WP-SD scenario, and DD scenario are mutually exclusive in  $\mathcal{S}$ .*

15 *Proof.* See Appendix I. □

16 Each of the three scenarios (RP-SD, WP-SD, DD) in  $\mathcal{S}$  is located in  $R$ - $k$  coordinate system  
 17 as shown in Figure 4. A large  $R$  entails more customer demand for the restaurant, and thus  
 18 the demand-dominant scenario is more likely to happen. This leads to the region of the WP-  
 19 DD scenario located above the region of the WP-SD scenario in the  $R$ - $k$  coordinate system. A  
 20 large  $k$  reflects that there will be more customer orders to be delivered, with less average spacing  
 21 between each customer. This potentially reduces the average return-pickup distance, which causes  
 22  $W_{fp} = \tau_M - W_p - W_{c,q}$  to tend to be larger. Therefore, an increase in  $k$  may bring the scenario from  
 23 the RP-SD scenario to the WP-SD scenario. These three scenarios spread in the  $R$ - $k$  coordinate  
 24 system, as shown in Figure 4 and the above discussion. The intersection point  $V_c$  is also on the

**Table 2:** Properties of the system under the RP-SD scenario

Variables	$N_v$	$N_b$	$W_p$	$W_{c,a}$	$W_{c,q}$	$W_{v,q}$	$W_{c,d}$	$W_{v,d}$	$W_c$	$W_v$	$\lambda$
$R$	↓	↑	↑	↘↗	→	↓	↘↗	↘↗	↘↗	↓	↑
$k$	↑	↓	↓	↑	→	↑	↑	↑	↑/↘↗	↑	↓

**Table 3:** Properties under the WP-SD scenario (red arrows are those that differ from Table 2)

Variables	$N_v$	$N_b$	$W_p$	$W_{c,a}$	$W_{c,q}$	$W_{v,q}$	$W_{c,d}$	$W_{v,d}$	$W_{fp}$	$W_c$	$W_v$	$\lambda$
$R$	↓	↑	↑	↘↗	→	↓	↘↗	↘↗	↓	↘↗	↓	↑
$k$	↑	↓	↓	↑	→	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↓

**Table 4:** Properties under the DD scenario (red arrows are those that differ from Table 3)

Variables	$N_v$	$N_b$	$W_p$	$W_{c,a}$	$W_{c,q}$	$W_{v,q}$	$W_{c,d}$	$W_{v,d}$	$W_{fp}$	$W_c$	$W_v$	$\lambda$
$R$	↑	↑	↑	↓	↑	→	↑	↑	↓	↓	↓	↑
$k$	↓	↓	↓	↑	↓	→	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↓


1 curve  $\mathcal{L}_e$  because on  $V_c$ ,  $N_v = \lambda\tau$  and  $W_s = 0$ , which satisfies the existence condition represented  
 2 by the curve  $\mathcal{L}_e$ .

### 3 4.4 Model properties

4 Properties of the decision variables are summarized in Table 2 through Table 4. In the tables,  $\rightarrow$   
 5 denotes that the decision variables do not have an impact;  $\uparrow$  or  $\nearrow$  that the dependent variables  
 6 increase with respect to the decision variables; and  $\downarrow$  or  $\searrow$  that the dependent variables decrease  
 7 with respect to the decision variables. Also, we make a mild assumption that  $R > \tau v$ , because the  
 8 matching interval is normally very small and drivers are not expected to travel to the border of the  
 9 delivery area within a single matching interval.

10 **Proposition 2.** *In the SD scenario, some important properties of the OFD system are as follows:*

- 11 1. Customer accumulation time first decreases and then increases with the maximum delivery  
 12 distance  $R$ .
- 13 2. Customer delivery time first decreases and then increases with the maximum delivery distance  
 14  $R$ .
- 15 3. Customer total waiting time first decreases and then increases with the maximum delivery  
 16 distance  $R$ .
- 17 4. In the RP-SD scenario, customer total waiting time monotonically increases with  $k$  when  $R$   
 18 is small, and first decreases and then increases with  $k$  when  $R$  is large.



**Figure 5:** Depiction of insights into the maximum delivery distance.

1 *Proof.* See Appendices J–L. □

2

3 **Insight of  $R$  into accumulation time.** From the expression of customer accumulation time  
 4  $W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2(q/\bar{N}_w)}$ , the non-monotonic relationship can be attributed to the different rate of change of  
 5  $q$  and  $\bar{N}_w$  with respect to  $R$  because both of them increase with  $R$ . When  $R$  is relatively small,  $q$   
 6 increases slower than  $\bar{N}_w$  does, and when  $R$  gets larger, the quadratic term of  $q$  makes it increase  
 7 faster and surpass the rate of change of  $\bar{N}_w$ . Intuitively, the accumulation time is dependent on  
 8 the customer demand of a sector of the circular delivery area. When  $R$  is small, it is conceivable  
 9 that the sector is “fat”, having a larger angle compared with that when  $R$  is large where the sector  
 10 is “thin” (see Figure 5a as an illustration). If customer demand arrives at the space uniformly,  
 11 the probability of a customer appearing at one specific sector is non-monotonically related to  $R$ .  
 12 As  $R$  increases, although the total demand of a service region increases, the demand for each  
 13 sector does not necessarily increase because the sector becomes thinner, which contributes to the  
 14 non-monotonicity.

15 **Insight of  $R$  into delivery time.** Proposition 2.1 presents a non-monotonic relationship of  
 16 delivery time with  $R$ . This is because of the change in each driver’s individual delivery area. When  
 17 the delivery radius  $R$  increases and the delivery area covers more customer demand, the number  
 18 of working drivers  $N_w$  gets larger to fulfill the increased customer demand. When more drivers are  
 19 involved in delivery, the platform can design better delivery routes (e.g., each driver only serves a  
 20 narrow sector in the circular delivery region) to avoid some unnecessary detours—and thus shorter  
 21 delivery time, as shown in Figure 5a. On the other hand, however, the increase in the delivery  
 22 radius per se causes the delivery distance to be larger. These two trends in response to the change  
 23 in  $R$  finally cause the delivery distance to behave non-monotonically from small to large  $R$ . In  
 24 scenarios in which  $R$  is relatively small, the driver delivery area is not large enough, which results  
 25 in each driver being allocated a relatively broad sector (as evidenced by the large inner angle  
 26  $\theta$ ). Under such circumstances, an increase in the delivery area may have a great impact on the  
 27 transversal delivery distance associated with each driver. In contrast, in the context of large  $R$ ,


1 the system features many working drivers with each in charge of a very narrow region. Therefore,  
 2 any optimization efforts that target the transverse detour may not have significant influences as  
 3 the increase in  $R$  itself. In this scenario, the line-haul distance emerges as the primary determinant  
 4 that influences the delivery distance. As shown in [Figure 5b](#), when  $R$  gets larger, the impact of  
 5 the increase in transversal distance  $L_t$  tends to be small, and the delivery distance  $L_d = L_a + L_t$   
 6 increases with  $R$ . The transition of the dominant influential factor causes the delivery time to be  
 7 non-monotonic with  $R$ .

8 **Insight of  $R$  into customer total waiting time.** Customer total waiting time exhibits a non-  
 9 monotonic relationship with  $R$ . Specifically, for smaller values of  $R$  (which represent a smaller  
 10 service region and thus smaller demand), an increase in  $R$  correlates with a decrease in customer  
 11 total waiting time. Conversely, for larger values of  $R$  (larger service region, larger demand), an  
 12 increase in  $R$  results in an increase in customer total waiting time. This non-monotonic relationship  
 13 can be attributed to the fact that  $W_c$  is the superposition of two major waiting times  $W_{c,a}$  and  
 14  $W_{c,d}$ , and other minor waiting times (in SD scenario) such as  $W_p$ ,  $W_{c,q}$ , and  $W_{fp}$ . Both of  $W_{c,a}$   
 15 and  $W_{c,d}$  have a non-monotonic relationship with  $R$ .

16 **Insight into the bundling ratio.** For a stable system, in which all the customer demand can  
 17 be served, whether to bundle depends on customer demand. If customer demand is small, there  
 18 is no need to bundle because the nature of bundling is to deal with large demand. This is shown  
 19 in [Figure 6a](#), where the optimal point corresponds to a bundling ratio less than 2, indicating that  
 20 bundling is unnecessary. However, the bundling ratio does not always follow the rule “the larger  
 21 the better.” When the realized customer demand is high (i.e.,  $R$  is large) while still maintaining the  
 22 system stability, system operators may consider order bundling and there is a trade-off between (1)  
 23 order accumulation and delivery time and (2) return-pickup time. Bundling requires an accumula-  
 24 tion of orders and increases the delivery time. On the other hand, it reduces average return-pickup  
 25 time because more customers in a bundle means shorter expected return-pickup distance from the  
 26 last delivery’s endpoint to the restaurant. When  $k$  is small, the effect of the return-pickup time  
 27 dominates the effects of other components of  $W_c$ , which results in a decrease in  $W_c$  with  $k$ . In  
 28 contrast, when  $k$  is large, customers may need to wait a very long time for order accumulation and  
 29 delivery, both of which increase with  $k$ . Therefore, under large customer demand, the customer’s  
 30 waiting time first decreases and then increases with  $k$ , as shown in [Figure 6b](#).

## 31 5 Operational strategies

32 This section describes two objectives for OFD platform operation: minimizing customer total wait-  
 33 ing time ( $W_c$ ) and maximizing order throughput ( $q_t$ ). The former describes the service experience  
 34 on the customer’s side and the latter characterizes how much customer demand can be served by  
 35 the platform. We also investigate the Pareto-efficient curve, which reflects the outcome of our  
 36 multi-objective optimization. On the Pareto-efficient curve, there is no better possible outcome for  
 37 one objective without causing the other optimized objective to become worse. For brevity, hereafter  
 38 we denote the optimal customer total waiting time as  $W_c^*$  and  $q_t^*$  for the optimal order throughput.



**Figure 6:** Diagram for the insights of  $k$ ; red stars are desired.  $k_p$  denotes that causes  $W_c$  to be the smallest.

## 5.1 Optimizing customer total waiting time

In this section, we discuss the tactical strategy for choosing a suitable pair of decision variables  $R$  and  $k$  to optimize customer total waiting time—i.e., to achieve the shortest customer total waiting time.

**Proposition 3.**  $W_c^*$  always happens in the RP-SD scenario (including its boundaries,  $\mathcal{L}_e \cap \{(R, k) | \Delta_c \leq 0\}$  and  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP} \cap \{(R, k) | \Delta_c \leq 0\}$ ), where  $W_{fp} = 0$  and  $N_v \geq N_b$  (DSMR and RPWP criteria should be satisfied as described in Lemma 3 and Lemma 5).

*Proof.* We find the shortest customer total waiting time using the diagram adapted from Figure 4, shown in Figure 7a. Note that the “Invalid region” refers to the scenario where  $\theta > \pi$ , which is outside the focus of this study (see discussion in Section 3.3.3). Path 1 locates where  $R$  only cause the system to be SD scenario (below  $V_c$ ), but drivers can either wait for food preparation or not. Path 2 and Path 3 are in the region where drivers have to wait for food preparation, but both SD and DD scenarios are possible. We then show that the customer total waiting time will decrease along each of these paths.

Along Path 1 and according to our results for  $W_c$  in Table 2 and Table 3, we know that reducing the bundling ratio from an initial point in the region of the WP-SD scenario can reduce  $W_c$ , and thus improve  $W_c$ . Since it is possible for customer total waiting time in the RP-SD scenario to increase with  $k$ , the smallest  $W_c$  on Path 1 will happen either at point  $V_1$ , or inside the region of the RP-SD scenario ( $W_c$  is continuous across  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$  because the model solution is continuous according to Lemma 2). Along Path 2 and according to our results for  $W_c$  in Table 3 and Table 4 and the continuity according to Lemma 2, we know that the smallest  $W_c$  happens at the point at the stability boundary  $\mathcal{L}_e$ , shown as the brown star in Figure 7a. Along Path 3, we prove in Appendix M that on the boundary  $\mathcal{L}_e$ ,  $W_c$  decreases with  $R$  and  $k$ . Therefore, the smallest  $W_c$  on Path 3 is at point  $V_c$ . Consequently,  $W_c^*$  always happens inside the region of the RP-SD scenario (including its boundaries). Therefore, to seek the  $W_c^*$ , the platform should ensure that the number of vacant drivers in the market is larger than the order bundles, and avoid causing drivers to wait at the restaurant for food preparation—then find a proper pair of  $R$  and  $k$  in the region of the RP-SD scenario for  $W_c^*$ .  $\square$




Figure 7: Diagrams for Proposition 3 and Proposition 5.

## 5.2 Maximizing order throughput

Order throughput  $q_t$  is the quantity of customer demand that can be served by the system in a unit amount of time. If the system is stable, order throughput is equal to realized customer demand because all customer demand can be served. Otherwise, for a pair of decision variables  $(R, k)$  causing the system's being unstable because of insufficient delivery supply, order throughput is defined as the maximum rate of orders that can be served in which all the drivers are moving around for either delivery or return-pickup (where the order throughput is less than the customer demand). Thus, order throughput has two distinct formulations for the stable system and the unstable system:

$$q_t = \begin{cases} q, & \text{stable system,} \\ \hat{q} < q, & \text{unstable system.} \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

**Proposition 4.** *If the system does not meet the existence condition in Lemma 1, order throughput  $q_t$  equals  $\hat{q}$ , and it increases with  $k$  and decreases with  $R$  (see the specific expression of  $\hat{q}$  in Appendix N).*

*Proof.* See Appendix N. □

**Insight into  $R$  and  $k$  under an unstable system.** If the system exhibits a shortage in delivery supply, the strategy of order bundling may effectively address this shortage. Consequently, an increase in variable  $k$  might facilitate system equilibrium. Moreover, a reduction in  $R$  is anticipated to decrease realized customer demand, and thereby further contribute positively to the stability of the system. Though order throughput can be defined in the unstable region,  $W_c$  is not defined when the system is unstable. This is because there will always be some customers in the system who cannot be served in an unstable system, and these customers' waiting time is undefined. According to Proposition 4, the platform operator should raise  $k$  or reduce  $R$  to reach the food delivery supply-demand balance again and avoid the system's instability.

For a stable system,  $q_t^*$  has the following property.

1 **Proposition 5.** *If the system meets the existence condition in Lemma 1,  $q_t^*$  happens when the*  
 2 *maximum delivery distance is the largest possible. Also, since there exists a circumstance where  $R$*   
 3 *can reduce  $W_c$  according to Proposition 2.1, there exists a range of  $R$  that increasing  $R$  benefits*  
 4 *both  $W_c$  and  $q_t$ . This is termed the win-win scenario, shown in Figure 7b.*

5 If the system meets the existence condition in Lemma 1, the rate of served customer demand  
 6 is only related to maximum delivery distance  $R$ , and  $R$  contributes positively to  $q_t$ . This is because  
 7 all realized customer demand will be served in the equilibrium state, and the larger the maximum  
 8 delivery radius, the more customers will be covered and thus the larger  $q_t$ . Therefore, to seek  $q_t^*$ ,  
 9 platform operators should set the largest possible  $R$  provided that the solution exists as described  
 10 in Lemma 1.

11 At this point, we know the tactical strategies for  $W_c$  minimization and  $q_t$  maximization, re-  
 12 spectively: For  $W_c^*$ , the platform should control the decision variables so that the system falls into  
 13 the RP-SD scenario; for  $q_t^*$ , the platform should increase the maximum delivery distance. For both  
 14 objectives, to ensure that the system reaches equilibrium, the bundling ratio should be larger than  
 15 the bundling threshold  $k > k_c$ . If the system falls into an unstable region, increasing  $k$  or decreas-  
 16 ing  $R$  can help the system achieve the food delivery supply–demand balance again. However, the  
 17 two optimization objectives contradict each other.  $q_t^*$  features the largest possible  $R$ —but  $W_c^*$  lies  
 18 inside the decision space of the RP-SD scenario, which normally does not guarantee  $q_t^*$ . Therefore,  
 19 decision-makers should refer to the Pareto-efficient curve, which can guide them for the bi-objective  
 20 operations.

### 21 5.3 Bi-objective optimization and the Pareto-efficient curve

22 The tactical strategy guided by two objectives varies from the relative importance of each objective.  
 23 Therefore, we investigate the Pareto-efficient curve, which is the path of the transition from one  
 24 extreme of solely optimizing  $W_c$  to another extreme of solely optimizing  $q_t$ . The optimal tactical  
 25 strategy is obtained by solving the subsequent optimization problem:

$$26 \quad \underset{k, R, N_b, N_v}{\text{maximize}} \quad \text{objective} = (1 - w)(-W_c(k, R)) + wq_t(k, R) \quad (37a)$$

$$27 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \text{Equations (5) to (7), (12), (13), (16) to (18) and (23),} \quad (37b)$$

$$28 \quad N_b \geq \lambda\tau, N_v \geq \lambda\tau, \quad (37c)$$

$$29 \quad \pi \geq \theta, \frac{1}{\tau_M} \geq \frac{q}{M}, \quad (37d)$$

30 where the two objectives are combined by the weighted sum strategy (Coleman et al., 1999, pp,  
 31 2–35), and  $0 \leq w \leq 1$  is the weighting coefficient. The optimal value of Equation (37d) is  $W_c^*$  when  
 32  $w = 0$ , and is  $q_t^*$  when  $w = 1$ . Denoting the optimal solution of Equation (37d) as  $(R^*, k^*)$ , we can  
 33 express them as a function of  $w$ :  $(R^*, k^*) = [R^*(w), k^*(w)]$ . For different weighting factors  $w$  the  
 34 optimal solution differs, and therefore all of the solutions can form a continuous path in the decision  
 35 space  $\mathcal{S}$ , which is the Pareto-efficient curve  $\mathcal{L}_{Pareto} = \{[R^*(w), k^*(w)] | 0 \leq w \leq 1\}$ . However, solving  
 36 the optimization problem in Equation (37d) is analytically intractable, we then demonstrate the  
 37 Pareto curve in the numerical study and identify the optimal tactical strategies. The weighted  
 38 sum strategy can produce the Pareto curve only if the curve lies on the convex boundary of the  
 39 stable region (in the objective space). We thus need to validate this prerequisite in our numerical  
 40 experiments.




Figure 8: Simulation logic


## 6 Numerical study

This section validates our analytical findings using simulation and numerical demonstrations. We first conduct a Monte Carlo simulation using a less restrictive setting and then illustrate the system numerically using different pairs of  $(R, k)$  under different setting of exogenous variables. Both the simulation study and the numerical demonstration validate the key analytical findings in this study.


### 6.1 Monte Carlo simulation on driver routing

The simulation is designed in a less restrictive setting where drivers' routings are specifically relying on randomly distributed customer demand rather than a predetermined approximated route. It verifies one of the key analytical findings of this paper, i.e., the non-monotonic response of delivery time with respect to the maximum delivery distance. The simulation outcomes align with our analytical results which demonstrates the robustness of our findings and also the usage of continuum approximation in driver routing.

The simulation logic is shown in Figure 8 as follows. For every pair of  $(R, k)$ , we first generate a cluster of random customer demand around a merchant and then screen eligible customers based on the maximum delivery distances, and solve a vehicle routing problem (VRP) for the eligible customers. Finally, we calculate each customer's delivery time. This process is repeated  $X$  times where  $X$  is a large enough number (here, we use  $X = 100$ ). Therefore, for every pair of  $(R, k)$  we will have an average customer delivery time. To discover how  $R$  and  $k$  would impact on  $W_{c,d}$ , we run the simulation for different pairs of decision variables. Note that, the simulation exhibits huge stochasticity and to see the trend of  $W_{c,d}$  with respect to  $R$ , we offset those  $W_{c,d}$  under large  $R$  using the  $W_{c,d}$  under the smallest  $R$ , and draw the curve of  $W_{c,d}$ 's v.s.  $R$ 's. For example, if the smallest  $R$  in the trial set is  $R = 2$  km and we have its associated delivery time  $W_{cd,R=2}$ , then for  $R = 3$  km we also have  $W_{cd,R=3}$ , and so do later  $R$ 's. Then on the graph, we show  $\{0, W_{cd,R=3} - W_{cd,R=2}, W_{cd,R=4} - W_{cd,R=2}, \dots\}$  v.s.  $\{2, 3, 4, \dots\}$ . Additionally, we also present the subtraction set  $\{W_{cd,R=R_i} - W_{cd,R=R_{i-1}}\}$  with respect to  $\{R_i\}$ . Therefore, to validate the non-monotonicity of  $W_{c,d}$  with  $R$ , we need to show in the trend graph a non-monotonic curve, and equivalently, to show negative mean values of subtraction values in the subtraction curve. Figures 9 to 11 show the simulation results. It is validated that as  $R$  increases, the trend of delivery time holds a non-monotonic relationship with  $R$ . Also, they show that as demand increases, the minimum value of delivery time decreases, which aligns with our analytical analysis (i.e., Equation (79)).




(a) Curves of  $W_{cd,R=R_i} - W_{cd,R=R_0}$  with  $R$ . Blue curves: simulation results; red curve: mean.




(b) Boxplot of  $W_{cd,R=R_i} - W_{cd,R=R_{i-1}}$  with  $R$ . Blue dots: simulation results; red boxes: boxplot.

Figure 9: Simulation results of  $k = 5$



(a) Curves of  $W_{cd,R=R_i} - W_{cd,R=R_0}$  with  $R$ . Blue curves: simulation results; red curve: mean.



(b) Boxplot of  $W_{cd,R=R_i} - W_{cd,R=R_{i-1}}$  with  $R$ . Blue dots: simulation results; red boxes: boxplot.

Figure 10: Simulation results of  $k = 7$




Figure 11: Simulation results of  $k = 9$

## 1 6.2 Numerical demonstration of properties

2 In this section, we perform numerical experiments to show our managerial findings and tactical  
3 strategies. We consider two experimental settings presented in Table 5. Setting 1 presents a case  
4 in which customer demand per merchant is low (2 orders/hr), while the customer demand per  
5 merchant in Setting 2 is relatively higher (20 orders/hr). This difference in demand effectively  
6 demonstrates the different properties of the model under low or high customer demand rates. Also,  
7 the restaurant’s food preparation rate in Setting 1 is lower, which facilitates a clearer observation  
8 of the DD scenario in this context. The value choices of parameters used in Table 5 are motivated  
9 by values reported in a research study by Meituan, a leading online food delivery (OFD) platform.  
10 For example, according to Meituan Research Institute and China Hotel Association (2019), the  
11 number of daily active drivers in Meituan in the first three quarters of 2019 is around 750 thousand  
12 and the total number of daily order transactions is around 26.8 million. Considering a Chinese  
13 fourth-tier city (e.g., Shaoguan city, around 2.8 million population) which takes the share of the  
14 OFD market of 0.12% (90 fourth-tier cities collectively share 10.9% of the market), there are around  
15 3000 transactions every hour. Similarly, the average hourly transaction for a fifth-tier city is around

Table 5: Numerical experiment settings


Parameters	Setting 1	Setting 2
$\tau$ [hr]	0.005	0.005
$\bar{q}$ [orders/hr]	1000	3000
$M$ [restaurants]	500	50
$N$ [vehicles]	600	600
$v$ [km/hr]	7	20
$1/\tau_M$ [orders/hr]	2	60

1 1000. Considering drivers' working time, there should be less than 900 active drivers every hour  
 2 and thus we use a fleet size of 600. However, we acknowledge that certain parameters, such as those  
 3 related to specific operational characteristics or cost structures, are challenging to obtain due to the  
 4 proprietary nature of platform data and the lack of comprehensive public reports. To address this,  
 5 we used synthetic data for parameters where real-world values are unavailable. These synthetic  
 6 values were chosen to reflect reasonable ranges based on our understanding of OFD systems and  
 7 to ensure the internal consistency of the model. For example, we use an average driver speed of 7  
 8 km/hour and 20 km/hour representing those who ride bikes or e-bikes/motorcycles, respectively,  
 9 for delivery in urban areas, and we use the food preparation rate ( $1/\tau_M$ ) of 2 orders/hour for the  
 10 slow case (Setting 1) and 60 orders/hour for a fast case (Setting 2), etc.


11 It is worth noting that the primary purpose of the numerical study is to illustrate and validate  
 12 the analytical findings, rather than to conduct a comparative study. Specifically, the numerical  
 13 experiments are designed to demonstrate the existence and behavior of the insights derived from our  
 14 theoretical framework. The values chosen in the numerical experiments are intended to highlight the  
 15 correctness of the findings across different scenarios. Next, we first show how the three scenarios  
 16 are distributed in  $\mathcal{S}$  in the  $R$ - $k$  coordinate system in **Figure 12**, and then present their model  
 17 properties in **Figure 13** and **Figure 14**, respectively. Finally, we show the Pareto-efficient curve for  
 18 both settings in **Figure 15**.

19 **Figure 12** depicts a scenario in which all of the RP-SD scenario, WP-SD scenario, and DD  
 20 scenario exist. As shown, stable regions for the RP-SD scenario, WP-SD scenario, and DD scenario  
 21 are mutually exclusive, and the unstable region locates in the top-left corner of the coordinates.  
 22 This indicates that large  $R$  or small  $k$  will cause the system to be unstable, consistent with our  
 23 discussion of **Proposition 1**.

24 We also show contour maps of customer total waiting time and order throughput  $q_t$  in **Figure 13**.  
 25 According to the contours **Figure 13a**, the minimum  $W_c$  locates in the decision space of the RP-



**Figure 12:** A sample decision plane in which all 3 scenarios are presented (experimental setting 1)



**Figure 13:** Numerical experiment for Proposition 1, Proposition 3, and Proposition 5 (experimental setting 1)


1 SD scenario (the top-left corner of the RP-SD scenario), which validates Proposition 3. For  $q_t$   
 2 maximization in Figure 13b, the target order throughput is at the top boundary of the coordinates,  
 3 which is consistent with our proposed strategy: Choose the largest  $R$  in the stable region in  
 4 Proposition 5. In the unstable region,  $W_c$  is undefined and order throughput increases with  $k$  and  
 5 decreases with  $R$ , which validates Proposition 4.

6 Figure 14 depicts a different market exogenous variable setting with an emphasis on the SD  
 7 scenario. The non-monotonic properties of customer accumulation time, delivery time, and total  
 8 waiting time with respect to  $R$  are clearly shown. As can be seen in Figure 14a and Figure 14b,  
 9 there exists a first decreasing, then increasing, relationship of accumulation time and delivery time  
 10 with respect to the maximum delivery distance  $R$ . Also, there exists a non-monotonic relationship  
 11 of  $W_c$  with  $R$  and  $k$  in Figure 14c, which shows the desire for order bundling at high demand (large  
 12  $R$ ) but not under low demand (small  $R$ ). These phenomena align with our analytical findings  
 13 presented in Proposition 2.

14 As shown in Figure 14c, there is a region (for example, when  $R = 4$  km) in which the  $W_c$  curve is  
 15 not monotonic with respect to  $k$ . This corresponds to the scenario we discussed in Proposition 2.3,  
 16 in which decision-makers should increase  $k$  when it is low and decrease  $k$  when it is high. It is also  
 17 easy to observe the win-win scenario in which an increase in  $R$  will benefit both  $W_c$  and  $q_t$  (for  
 18 instance, when  $k = 2$  in Figure 14c and Figure 14d). However, the optimal point of  $W_c$  is obviously  
 19 not the optimum of  $q_t$ , and then the Pareto-efficient curve is beneficial for platform operators  
 20 seeking to make decisions based on their targets, which is presented in Figure 15.

21 **Remark 1.** When the objective changes from  $W_c$  to  $q_t$ , i.e., when  $w$  changes from 0 to 1, both the  
 22 optimal bundling ratio  $k^*$  and the optimal maximum delivery distance  $R^*$  increase.

23 Figure 15 presents Pareto-efficient curves for the bi-objective optimization problem in both  
 24 the  $R$ - $k$  decision space and the  $W_c$ - $q_t$  objective space. As shown in Figure 15a and Figure 15c,  $q_t^*$   
 25 happens at the top boundary of the coordinates and the optimal point for maximizing  $W_c$  lies in  
 26 the decision space in the RP-SD scenario. The Pareto curve shows the optimal choice of decision  
 27 variables for different weights of  $q_t$  and  $W_c$ . If decision-makers regard  $W_c$  as more important, they  
 28 may choose a pair of decision variables close to the red star, which lies inside the decision space  
 29 of the RP-SD scenario, and close to the green star if they think raising  $q_t$  is more important. In  
 30 the objective space, we can see that the Pareto frontiers lie in the boundaries of the space where




**Figure 14:** Numerical experiment for the properties of the decision variables in Proposition 2 (using experimental setting 2). “Over-saturated demand” (see Section 3.3.4) means that demand results in the restaurant’s inability to prepare the meals.


1 the system is in equilibrium, which are convex frontiers; therefore, our use of the weighted sum  
 2 strategy in Equation (37d) is adequate. From the Pareto curve, we also know that both optimal  
 3 bundling ratio  $k^*$  and optimal maximum delivery distance  $R^*$  increase when the objective changes  
 4 from  $W_c$  to  $q_t$ . The intuition is that when  $q_t$  is becoming more important,  $R$  should be set larger.  
 5 When  $R$  increases, more customer demand is included in the system and it requires a larger  $k$  to  
 6 reach an optimal operation to respond to the larger demand.

## 7 Conclusion


8 We use market equilibrium as a tool to develop an analytical model from a high-level perspective  
 9 for on-demand food delivery (OFD) service that considers adjustable service region, order bundling,  
 10 and batch-matching. Under market equilibrium of delivery supply and demand balance, i.e., the  
 11 OFD demand is balanced with the delivery supply and the matching rate, we study the impact  
 12 of two decision variables ( $R$  and  $k$ ) in a good market condition (i.e., no excessively large or small  
 13 demand), and provide various managerial insights, which we summarize as follows.




(a) Pareto curve for the setting of Figure 14 in the decision variable space



(b) Pareto curve for the setting of Figure 14 in the objective space



(c) Pareto curve for the setting of Figure 13 in the decision variable space



(d) Pareto curve for the setting of Figure 13 in the objective space

**Figure 15:** Illustration of the Pareto-efficient curves (thick dashed blue curves),  $W_c^*$  (red stars), and  $q_t^*$  (green stars) in both the decision space and the objective space.

1 First, regarding the maximum delivery distance. In the supply-dominant scenario, delivery  
 2 time first decreases and then increases with maximum delivery distance. This non-monotonic  
 3 behavior is due to the different responses of the axial and transversal distances on the driver's  
 4 delivery route. The conflicting change in axial and transversal sizes of the delivery area (a slice of  
 5 a circular disk) also contributes to the non-monotonic relationship of customer accumulation time  
 6 with  $R$ . Apart from those,  $R$  also affects customer total waiting time in a non-monotonic way  
 7 because the customer total waiting time is majorly influenced by  $W_{c,a}$  and  $W_{c,d}$ , both of which first  
 8 decrease and then increase with  $R$ . Also, due to the non-monotonicity of  $R$  on  $W_c$ , there exists a  
 9 win-win scenario in which raising  $R$  can benefit both  $W_c$  and order throughput  $q_t$ .

10 The second conclusion regards the bundling ratio. The decision of the bundling ratio depends  
 11 on the volume of the customer demand rate. If the demand is excessively large, adopting order  
 12 bundling and increasing the bundling ratio can enhance the system's delivery supply and ultimately  
 13 help the system to maintain the delivery supply–demand balance. When demand is large, yet within  
 14 a range that remains within the system's food delivery capacity, there is an optimal bundling  
 15 ratio that minimizes customer total waiting time. In cases of low demand, bundling becomes  
 16 unnecessary, since bundling itself leads to detours and additional order accumulation time, both of

1 which negatively impact the service quality.

2 We also design optimal strategies for minimizing customer total waiting time and maximizing  
3 order throughput. For  $q_t$  maximization, the maximum delivery distance  $R$  should be set as large  
4 as possible. However, to optimize  $W_c$ , optimal  $R$  and  $k$  are normally small, whereby the operators  
5 should ensure that the OFD system is under the RP-SD scenario. On the Pareto-efficient curve, we  
6 observe that for an increase in  $R^*$ , the optimal bundling ratio  $k^*$  also increases when transitioning  
7 from optimizing  $W_c$  to optimizing  $q_t$ .

8 We acknowledge that the proposed model has some limitations. First, our model focuses on  
9 investigating the high-level impacts of the decision variables, and thus we did not consider the  
10 spatial and temporal dynamics of orders. Second, our findings are based on the approximation of  
11 customer arrivals through a fluid model, in which queue length's response in the food preparation  
12 period to increased demand is neglected. Also, our approximation on delivery route is for the av-  
13 erage behavior of the driver route which might not align with the single driver behavior in the real  
14 world. However, these approximations are made to maintain analytical tractability and fair com-  
15 parison among drivers, which are particularly useful for deriving closed-form solutions and provide  
16 theoretical guarantees for managerial insights. Third, this study adopts a series of simplifications  
17 and assumptions to ensure analytical tractability. While these simplifications inevitably abstract  
18 certain aspects of real-world complexity, they are carefully chosen to retain the most critical features  
19 of the market within the model. For example, demand is represented as a function of  $R$ , which,  
20 despite its simplicity, captures the core behavior of demand as influenced by delivery range. This  
21 formulation not only preserves the essential characteristics of customer behavior in the market but  
22 also facilitates the derivation of insightful analytical results regarding the impact of  $R$  on system  
23 performance. Future studies could build on this framework by relaxing some of these assumptions  
24 to incorporate additional real-world complexities. Additionally, future research is promising if more  
25 data is available. This study has the potential to be improved by calibrating its parameters such as  
26  $\eta$ , and performing a more accurate numerical study (both simulation and numerical demonstration  
27 calibration). Besides, the demand generation process and the relationship between dining demand  
28 and OFD-enabled trip demand could be explicitly studied. This can also be done by building a  
29 network-level model and integrating the dining demand generation process into the network model.  
30 The induced trip and its impact on the entire road network could be analyzed in the network scope.

31 The abovementioned limitations fall into other aspects of the OFD market and will require  
32 more specific models, and these aspects are left to be investigated in future studies. This work is  
33 one of the first attempts to investigate the tactical strategies of systematically deciding the service  
34 region size and bundling ratio for the OFD market under batch matching, and we hope our work  
35 can motivate further research on the OFD system.

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## 1 Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies

2 During the preparation of this work the authors used generative AI tools to improve language and  
3 readability of some parts of this work. After using this tool/service, the authors reviewed and  
4 edited the content as needed and took full responsibility for the content of the publication.

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## 1 Appendix A Proof of Equation (15)

$$\begin{aligned}
 2 \quad W_{c,d} &= \frac{1}{vk} \left[ \sum_{n:n \leq k/2} (nL_p + (n-1)l_t) + \sum_{n:n > k/2} ((n-1)L_p + nl_t) \right], \\
 3 \quad &= \frac{1}{vk} \left[ \sum_{n:n \leq k/2} nL_p + \sum_{n:n \leq k/2} (n-1)l_t + \sum_{n:n > k/2} (n-1)L_p + \sum_{n:n > k/2} nl_t \right], \\
 4 \quad &= \frac{1}{vk} \left[ -\frac{k}{2}L_p - \frac{k}{2}l_t + \sum_{n=1}^k nL_p + \sum_{n=1}^k nl_t \right], \\
 5 \quad &= \frac{1}{vk} \left[ (L_p + l_t) \left( -\frac{k}{2} + \sum_{n=1}^k n \right) \right] = \frac{1}{vk} \left[ \frac{k^2}{2} (L_p + l_t) \right] = \frac{L_p + L_d + 2R(\eta - 1)}{2v}.
 \end{aligned}$$

## 6 Appendix B Influence of the demand density rate

7 The demand density rate influences the monotonicity of delivery times because drivers are spread over the delivery  
 8 area and each driver is in charge of a sector with an inner angle  $\theta$ . This sector assignment is dependent on the  
 9 number of customers inside each sector. If  $\delta$  is highly concentrated in the center and is small in the outer region of  
 10 the delivery area, when  $R$  increases, reduction in the transversal travel distance is marginal compared with elongation  
 11 of the axial travel distance. Therefore, the delivery distance may monotonically increase with  $R$ .

12 We will next identify what kind of demand profile would cause this non-monotonicity. We make a blanket  
 13 assumption that realized demand  $q$  is an increasing, continuous, and differentiable function with  $R$ —i.e., the larger  
 14 the delivery area, the more customer demand. Demand density rate  $\delta$  can take various forms, such as decreasing,  
 15 among others. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that customers' delivery time will increase with  $R$  when  $R$  is large  
 16 because in this case, the included customer demand is very large and would render each driver's individual delivery  
 17 area very narrow. Then, to investigate whether the delivery time is non-monotonic, we can focus on whether delivery  
 18 time would decrease with  $R$  when  $R$  is relatively small. Also, we only need to focus on supply-dominant case, since  
 19 a small  $R$  (small demand) will normally cause  $N_v > N_b$ . First, we consider the derivative of  $W_{c,d}$  with  $R$ . In the  
 20 RP-SD scenario, we have

$$21 \quad \frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} = \frac{\partial W_{c,d}}{\partial q} \frac{dq}{dR} + \frac{\partial W_{c,d}}{\partial R}, \quad (38)$$

$$22 \quad = \frac{-2\pi^2 M^2 R^2 \delta k^2 v / q + \pi M k^2 v + 9Rq + 3\sqrt{2\pi M R k^2 q v + 9R^2 q^2}}{6v\sqrt{2\pi M R k^2 q v + 9R^2 q^2}}. \quad (39)$$

23 In the WP-SD scenario, we have

$$24 \quad \frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} = \frac{\partial W_{c,d}}{\partial q} \frac{dq}{dR} + \frac{\partial W_{c,d}}{\partial R_s} \frac{dR_s}{dR} + \frac{\partial W_{c,d}}{\partial R}, \quad (40)$$

$$25 \quad = \frac{-2\pi^2 M^2 R^2 \delta k^4 v / q + \pi M k^4 v + 9R_s k q (k - \eta) + 3(k - \eta)\sqrt{2\pi M R k^4 q v + 9R_s^2 k^2 q^2}}{6kv\sqrt{2\pi M R k^4 q v + 9R_s^2 k^2 q^2}}. \quad (41)$$

26 If these derivatives are negative when  $R$  is small, delivery time decreases with  $R$ . If we discover the sign of these  
 27 derivatives, we can focus on the numerators because the denominators are positive. Consider the limit of a small  $R$ .  
 28 For the RP-SD scenario, it is

$$29 \quad \lim_{R \rightarrow 0^+} \text{numerator} = \lim_{R \rightarrow 0^+} (-2\pi^2 M^2 R^2 \delta k^2 v / q + \pi M k^2 v). \quad (42)$$

30 For the WP-SD scenario, it is

$$31 \quad \lim_{R \rightarrow 0^+} \text{numerator} = \lim_{R \rightarrow 0^+} (-2\pi^2 M^2 R^2 \delta k^4 v / (q\tau_M) + \pi M k^4 v / \tau_M). \quad (43)$$

1 The condition whereby these limits are zero is

$$2 \quad 2\pi MR^2\delta = q, \quad (44)$$

3 where  $2\pi MR^2\delta = \frac{dq}{dR}$  according to Equation (3), which yields

$$4 \quad \frac{dq}{dR} R = q. \quad (45)$$

5 The general solution of this ordinary differential equation is

$$6 \quad q = cR, \quad (46)$$

7 where  $c$  is a constant, and the corresponding demand density rate is

$$8 \quad \delta = \frac{1}{2\pi MR} \frac{dq}{dR}, \quad (47)$$

$$9 \quad = \frac{c}{2\pi MR}. \quad (48)$$

10 This general solution indicates that when  $q$  is a proportional function of  $R$ , customers' delivery time tends to  
 11 be independent of  $R$  when  $R$  is very small. In this case, customer demand density rate  $\delta$  is an inversely proportional  
 12 function of  $R$ , which means the customer demand is relatively more concentrated in the center compared with the  
 13 constant customer demand we used in the main text. If customer demand density gets even more concentrated in  
 14 the center, customers' delivery time will be monotonic for every  $R$ ; e.g., Figure 16a. Otherwise, for a more amortized  
 15 customer demand density, customers' delivery time will present a first decreasing, then increasing, relationship with  
 16  $R$ ; see Figure 16b.





Figure 16: Contours of customers' delivery time for two different  $q$  profiles (using experimental setting 2).

## 17 Appendix C Simulation on driver routes


18 This section presents the results of our numerical experiments concerning the routes taken by drivers, in relation  
 19 to open Vehicle Routing Problem (open-VRP) configurations. We executed Monte Carlo simulations, similar to the  
 20 workflow as depicted in Figure 8, albeit within an open-VRP context instead of VRP. The aim was to validate whether  
 21 the distance from the depot to the furthest delivery point exceeded the distance to the endpoint of each route.

22 The findings of these simulations are presented in Figure 17. These results confirm our hypothesis, confirming  
 23 that the distance from the depot (in this case, the restaurant) to the most distant point on the delivery routes is, on  
 24 average, shorter than the distance to the final drop-off location of the routes, and the result is statistically significant.  
 25 This suggests that even within an open-VRP framework, drivers tend to return to the depot. The results also reflect  
 26 that, a larger bundling ratio would result in a more return-like route. We also visualize some open-VRP results in  
 27 Figure 18, which shows that the routes are similar to the VRP results.

1 It is important to note that this simulation did not factor in the potential influence of drivers' familiarity with  
 2 specific regions. This familiarity could conceivably incline drivers further towards returning to the restaurant, given  
 3 their preference for operating within known areas. Therefore, our findings suggest that the open-VRP delivery setting  
 4 also commonly sees drivers returning to the depot and **Figure 2** is applicable to represent the delivery route.



**Figure 17:** Distribution of the distance to endpoint (blue) and farthest point (orange) of routes where the p-value is drawn from the hypothesis test of whether the mean value of two distributions are different.



**Figure 18:** Visualization of some open-VRP results.

## 5 Appendix D Proof of Lemma 1

6 The stability of each scenario depends on whether food delivery supply can satisfy food delivery demand. To better  
 7 understand the system, we introduce a concept called buffer driver, which includes drivers who are waiting for  
 8 matching but will not get matched and those who are waiting for meal preparation (if it exists). Thus,  $N_{buffer} =$   
 9  $(N_v - \lambda\tau) + W_{fp}\lambda$ . These two types of drivers can be regarded as a buffer in the system because when demand goes  
 10 up, intuitively, these drivers can be assigned to order delivery or pickup, which can raise the system's food delivery  
 11 supply and restore the system to equilibrium.

12 Thus, the critical condition for the system to be stable is that the number of buffer drivers equals 0. The critical  
 13 bundling ratio can be calculated by substituting  $W_{fp} = 0$  and  $N_v = \lambda\tau$  into **Equation (23)**, which gives

$$14 \quad k_c = \frac{18NRq + 9Nq\tau v + 3q\sqrt{8\pi MR^2q\tau + 2\pi MRq\tau^2 v + 36N^2 R^2}}{18N^2 v - 4\pi MRq}. \quad (49)$$

15 Therefore, if  $k > k_c$  is met we have  $N_{buffer} > 0$ , and thus the food delivery supply is sufficient, which indicates  
 16 that the equilibrium solution exists. Since this analysis is not differentiated from each scenario, the solution exists for  
 17 all scenarios (defined in **Section 4.1.1**) as long as the existence condition is met. We also have  $dk_c/dR > 0$ , because

1 the numerator of  $k_c$  in Equation (49) increases with  $R$  but its denominator decreases with  $R$ . This trend can be  
 2 interpreted as follows: If  $R$  increases, the critical bundling ratio should also increase to fulfill the increased demand.

### 3 Appendix E Proof of Lemma 2

4 We first prove that  $W_c$  is continuous at any point on  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$ .

5 *Proof.* Let  $(k_0, R_0)$  be a point on the curve  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP} \subset \mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{N}_1, \mathcal{N}_2$  be the neighborhoods of  $(k_0, R_0)$  on either side  
 6 of  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$ . For any pair of points  $(k_1, R_1)$  and  $(k_2, R_2)$  in  $\mathcal{N}_1$  and  $\mathcal{N}_2$ , respectively, if we let  $(k_1, R_1)$  and  $(k_2, R_2)$   
 7 approach  $(k_0, R_0)$ , and if the following condition is met:

$$8 \quad \lim_{(k_1, R_1) \rightarrow (k_0, R_0)} (N_b, N_v) = \lim_{(k_2, R_2) \rightarrow (k_0, R_0)} (N_b, N_v), \quad (50)$$

9  $W_c$  is continuous at any point on  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP} \subset \mathcal{S}$ . If  $(k_1, R_1) \rightarrow (k_0, R_0)$  and  $(k_2, R_2) \rightarrow (k_0, R_0)$ , the equilibrium  
 10 solution comes from Equation (23) with  $W_{fp} = 0$ , which certainly produces the same solution.

11 □

12 We then prove that  $W_c$  is continuous at any point on  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$ .

13 *Proof.* If the system is under the Wait-for-Pickup scenario according to the RPWP criterion in Lemma 5, let  $(k_a, R_a)$   
 14 be a point on the curve  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD} \subset \mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{N}_b, \mathcal{N}_c$  be the neighborhoods of  $(k_a, R_a)$  on either side of  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$ . For  
 15 any pair of points  $(k_b, R_b)$  and  $(k_c, R_c)$  in  $\mathcal{N}_b$  and  $\mathcal{N}_c$ , respectively, if we let  $(k_b, R_b)$  and  $(k_c, R_c)$  approach  $(k_a, R_a)$ ,  
 16 and if the following condition is met:

$$17 \quad \lim_{(k_b, R_b) \rightarrow (k_a, R_a)} (N_b, N_v) = \lim_{(k_c, R_c) \rightarrow (k_a, R_a)} (N_b, N_v), \quad (51)$$

18  $W_c$  is continuous at any point on  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD} \subset \mathcal{S}$ . If  $(k_b, R_b) \rightarrow (k_a, R_a)$  and  $(k_c, R_c) \rightarrow (k_a, R_a)$ , the equilibrium  
 19 solution comes from Equation (23) with  $W_{c,q} = W_{v,q} = \tau/2$ , which certainly produces the same solution.

20 □

### 21 Appendix F Proof of Lemma 3

22 From Equation (27) we have

$$23 \quad 8\pi MRk^2q - 36N^2k^2v + 72NR_s kq + 36Nkq\tau v - 36R_s q^2\tau - 9q^2\tau^2v = 0, \quad (52)$$

24 where  $R_s = R + W_{fp}v/2$  and the left-hand side of Equation (52) is defined as  $\Delta_c$ . Since the solution is contin-  
 25 uous on the curve  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$  according to Lemma 2, we consider  $R_s$  using its formulation in the SD scenario,

$$26 \quad R_s = \max \left[ R + \frac{v}{2} \left( \tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} \right), R \right].$$

27 If the system is under certain decision variables such that  $N_v = \hat{N}_v$ ,  $N_b = \hat{N}_b$ , and  $\Delta_c = \hat{\Delta}_c \leq 0$ , simplify and  
 28 reorder Equation (52). We have

$$29 \quad \frac{2\pi MRq}{9v} - N^2 + 2NR_s\lambda/v + N\lambda\tau - R_s\lambda^2\tau/v - \frac{\lambda^2\tau^2}{4} \leq 0, \quad (53)$$

$$30 \quad \frac{1}{v} \left[ \frac{2\pi MRk\lambda}{9 \left( N - \frac{1}{2}\lambda\tau \right)} + 2R_s\lambda \right] + \frac{1}{2}\lambda\tau \leq N, \quad (54)$$

$$31 \quad \left[ \lambda(W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp}) + N_v - \lambda\tau/2 \right] \Big|_{N_v=N_b=\lambda\tau} \leq N, \quad (55)$$

32 where the term  $\left[ \lambda(W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp}) + N_v - \lambda\tau/2 \right] \Big|_{N_v=N_b=\lambda\tau}$  is equal to  $N$  if  $\Delta_c = 0$ . On top of that, it should

33 be satisfied that  $\lambda(W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp}) + N_v - \lambda\tau/2 = N, \forall (R, k)$ . Since  $\frac{\partial}{\partial N_b}(W_p + W_{v,d} + W_{fp}) \leq 0$  and  $\frac{\partial}{\partial N_v}(W_p +$   
 34  $W_{v,d} + W_{fp}) > 0$ , we also know from Section 3.4 that either  $N_b$  or  $N_v$  equals  $\lambda\tau$ . Therefore, the condition  $\Delta_c \leq 0$   
 35 (equivalently, Equation (55)) implies that  $N_b = \lambda\tau, N_v \geq \lambda\tau$  or  $N_b \leq \lambda\tau, N_v = \lambda\tau$ . Since both  $N_v$  and  $N_b$  should be  
 36 greater than  $\lambda\tau$ , we have  $N_b = \lambda\tau, N_v \geq \lambda\tau$ , which indicates that the system is under the SD scenario. Conversely, if  
 37 the system is under certain decision variables that have  $\Delta_c = \hat{\Delta}_c > 0$ , it is under the DD scenario.

## 1 Appendix G Proof of Lemma 4

2 Consider the implicit differentiation  $\frac{dR}{dk}$  in Equation (52):

$$3 \quad \frac{d}{dk} (8\pi MRk^2q - 36N^2k^2v + 72NR_s kq + 36Nkq\tau v - 36R_s q^2\tau - 9q^2\tau^2v) = 0, \quad (56)$$

$$4 \quad \begin{aligned} & 16\pi MRkq + 8\pi Mk^2 \left( q \frac{dR}{dk} + \frac{dq}{dR} \frac{dR}{dk} R \right) - 72N^2kv + 72NR_s q \\ & + 72Nk \left[ q \left( \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} \frac{dR}{dk} + \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial k} \right) + R_s \frac{dq}{dR} \frac{dR}{dk} \right] + 36N\tau vq + 36Nk\tau v \frac{dq}{dR} \frac{dR}{dk} \\ & - 36q^2\tau \left( \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} \frac{dR}{dk} + \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial k} \right) - 36\tau R_s \cdot 2q \frac{dq}{dR} \frac{dR}{dk} - 18q\tau^2v \frac{dq}{dR} \frac{dR}{dk} = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

5 where  $\frac{\partial R_s}{\partial k} = \frac{R\eta}{k^2}$ , and  $\frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} = -\frac{\eta}{k} + 1$ . Then we have

$$6 \quad \frac{dR}{dk} = \frac{-16\pi MRkq + 72N^2kv - 72NR_s q - 36Nq\tau v - 72Nkq \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial k} + 36q^2\tau \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial k}}{8\pi Mk^2 \left( q + \frac{dq}{dR} R \right) + 72Nk \left( q \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} + R_s \frac{dq}{dR} \right) + 36Nk\tau v \frac{dq}{dR} - 36q^2\tau \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} - 72\tau R_s q \frac{dq}{dR} - 18q\tau^2v \frac{dq}{dR}}, \quad (58)$$

$$7 \quad = \frac{-16\pi MRkq + 72N^2kv - 72NR_s q - 36Nq\tau v - \frac{72NqR\eta}{k} + \frac{36q^2\tau R\eta}{k^2}}{8\pi Mk^2 \left( q + \frac{dq}{dR} R \right) + 72Nk \left( q \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} + R_s \frac{dq}{dR} \right) + 36Nk\tau v \frac{dq}{dR} - 36q^2\tau \frac{\partial R_s}{\partial R} - 72\tau R_s q \frac{dq}{dR} - 18q\tau^2v \frac{dq}{dR}}. \quad (59)$$

8 Since the vehicle fleet size is larger than the number of drivers who are delivering, heading for pickup, and  
9 matching, we have (note that when  $\Delta_c = 0$ ,  $N_b = N_v = \lambda\tau$ )

$$10 \quad N > \frac{q}{k} \left( \frac{2R_s}{v} + \frac{2Rk\theta}{9v} + \frac{\tau}{2} \right) \quad (60)$$

$$11 \quad = \frac{q}{k} \left[ \frac{2R_s}{v} + \frac{2\pi MRk}{9v(N - \lambda\tau/2)} + \frac{\tau}{2} \right]. \quad (61)$$

12 Multiplying the left-hand side by  $N$  yields

$$13 \quad N^2 > \frac{q}{k} \left[ \frac{2R_s}{v} N + \frac{1}{2} N\tau + \frac{2\pi MRk}{9v} \frac{N}{N - \lambda\tau/2} \right] \quad (62)$$

$$14 \quad > \frac{q}{k} \left[ \frac{2R_s}{v} N + \frac{1}{2} N\tau + \frac{2\pi MRk}{9v} \right]. \quad (63)$$

15 Simplify, and we obtain

$$16 \quad N^2kv > 2NR_s q + \frac{1}{2} N\tau qv + \frac{2\pi MRkq}{9}. \quad (64)$$

17 Since the pickup distance is no larger than the maximum delivery distance, we have  $\frac{2R\eta}{k} \leq R$ , which yields  $\eta \leq k/2 < k$ .

18 Then the numerator of Equation (59) satisfies

$$19 \quad \text{numerator of Equation (59)} > -16\pi MRkq + 72N^2kv - 72NR_s q - 36Nq\tau v - \frac{72NqR\eta}{k} \quad (65)$$

$$20 \quad > -16\pi MRkq + 72N^2kv - 72NR_s q - 36Nq\tau v - 72NqR \quad (66)$$

$$21 \quad > -16\pi MRkq + 72N^2kv - 144NR_s q - 36Nq\tau v, \quad (67)$$

22 which is greater than 0 because of Equation (64). Similarly, since  $N > 2\lambda R_s/v + \lambda\tau/2$  and  $2Nk > q\tau$ , the denominator  
23 of Equation (59) is also greater than 0. As a result,  $\frac{dR}{dk} > 0$ .

## 1 Appendix H Proof of Lemma 5

2 In the SD scenario, if  $\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} \leq 0$ ,  $W_{fp} = 0$ , and thus the OFD system is under the RP scenario; if  
 3  $\tau_M - \frac{2R\eta}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} > 0$ ,  $W_{fp} > 0$  and the OFD system is under the WP scenario.

4 In the DD scenario, to ensure the solution exists, it should be satisfied that  $W_{fp} \geq 0$  because  $N_v = \lambda\tau$ . When  
 5  $W_{fp} = 0$ , it corresponds to the RP scenario and the condition that  $k = k_c(R)$ , which means that the RP-DD scenario  
 6 is on boundary  $\mathcal{L}_e$ . Otherwise, when  $W_{fp} > 0$ , it should be satisfied that  $k > k_c(R)$ .

## 7 Appendix I Proof of Proposition 1

8 Assume that the solution is not unique, and there exists a second (or more) pair of solutions  $N_v = \hat{N}_v$  and  $N_b = \hat{N}_b$   
 9 under the current pair of decision variables  $(R, k)$ , such that the equilibrium conditions in Equation (23) are satisfied  
 10 and this pair of solutions causes the system to lie in one of three scenarios: RP-SD, WP-SD, or DD. Additionally,  
 11 the first pair of solutions causes the system to lie in one of the three scenarios. Without loss of generality, we assume  
 12 the system is under the RP-SD scenario for the first pair of solutions. Then, the second pair of solutions must not  
 13 cause the system to lie in the RP-SD scenario, because we have already shown that there is only one valid solution  
 14 for the RP-SD scenario. Thus, the system is under either the WP-SD scenario or the DD scenario. However, since  
 15 both  $\mathcal{L}_{RP,WP}$  and  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$  are only dependent on the decision variables under certain given exogenous variables, the  
 16 current decision variables  $(R, k)$  cannot cause the system to line in a scenario other than the RP-SD scenario, which  
 17 yields a contradiction. Therefore, the second pair of solutions  $(\hat{N}_b, \hat{N}_v)$  does not exist and the solution  $(N_b, N_v)$  under  
 18 each pair of decision variables  $(R, k)$  is unique. Since the system equilibrium solution exists and is unique for each  
 19 pair of decision variables  $(R, k)$ , the regions of all three scenarios are mutually exclusive in  $\mathcal{S}$  in the  $R$ - $k$  coordinate  
 20 system.

## 21 Appendix J Proof of Table 2

### 22 J.1 Properties of $N_v$

23 For  $\delta = \bar{q}/R_a^2$ , we have

$$24 \quad N_v = N - \frac{6R^3\bar{q} - 3R^2\bar{q}\tau v + 2\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{6R_a^2 k v}. \quad (68)$$

25 Consider the derivatives

$$26 \quad \frac{dN_v}{dR} = - \frac{R\bar{q} \left( \pi R_a^2 M R k^2 v + 9R^4 \bar{q} + (3R - \tau v) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{R_a^2 k v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}}, \quad (69)$$

$$27 \quad \frac{dN_v}{dk} = \frac{R^2 \bar{q} \left( 6R^4 \bar{q} + (2R - \tau v) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{2R_a^2 k^2 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}} > 0. \quad (70)$$

28 Since it is assumed that  $R > \tau v$ . Thus,  $N_v$  decreases with  $R$  and increases with  $k$ .

### 29 J.2 Properties of $N_b$ , $W_p$ , $W_{c,q}$ , $W_{v,q}$ , $\lambda$ , $W_v$

30 Recall from Equation (29) that  $N_b = \lambda\tau = \frac{R^2 \bar{q} \tau}{R_a^2 k}$ . It is straightforward that,  $N_b$  monotonically decreases with  $k$ , while  
 31 it monotonically increases with  $R$ .

32 Recall from Equation (11) and Equation (13) that  $W_p = 2R/(kv)$ , which increases with  $R$  and decreases with  $k$ .

33 Recall from Equation (5) that  $W_{c,q} = \tau/2$ , which is straightforward that  $W_{c,q}$  is not impacted by  $R$  or  $k$ .

Recall from Equation (6) that

$$W_{v,q} = \frac{\tau N_v}{N_b} - \frac{\tau}{2} = \frac{N_v}{\lambda} - \frac{\tau}{2} \quad (71)$$

$$= \frac{R_a^2 N k}{R^2 \bar{q}} - \frac{R}{v} - \frac{\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{3R^2 \bar{q} v}. \quad (72)$$

$W_{v,q}$  decreases with  $R$  because  $N_v$  decreases with  $R$  and  $\lambda$  increases with  $R$ .  $W_{v,q}$  increases with  $k$  because  $N_v$  increases with  $k$  and  $\lambda$  decreases with  $k$ .

Recall that in equilibrium,  $\lambda = q/k = \bar{q}R^2/(R_a^2 k)$ . Therefore,  $\lambda$  increases with  $R$ , and decreases with  $k$ .

Recall that according to vehicle conservation,  $W_v = N/\lambda$ . Therefore,  $W_v$  increases with  $k$  and decreases with  $R$ .

### J.3 Properties of $W_{v,d}$

From equilibrium condition Equation (23b) we have

$$W_{v,d} = \frac{N - N_v}{\lambda} - W_p + \frac{\tau}{2} = \frac{3R^3 \bar{q} k - 6R^3 \bar{q} + k \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{3R^2 \bar{q} k v}, \quad (73)$$

$$\frac{dW_{v,d}}{dR} = - \frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v - 9R^3 \bar{q} k - 3k \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} + 6 \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{3k v \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}} = 0, \quad (74)$$

$$\implies R = \frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v (k^2 - 2k + 2 - (k-2) \sqrt{k^2 - k + 1})}{18 \bar{q} (k-1)}. \quad (75)$$

The second-order derivative of  $W_{v,d}$  with respect to  $R$  indicates that there exists a minimum value because

$$\frac{d^2}{dR^2} W_{v,d} = \frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^2 (\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 18R^3 \bar{q})}{R \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})} > 0. \quad (76)$$

Therefore,  $W_{v,d}$  first increase, then decrease, then increase.

$$\frac{dW_{v,d}}{dk} = \frac{2R (\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v + 3 \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2})}{3k^2 v \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}} > 0. \quad (77)$$

Thus,  $W_{v,d}$  increases with  $k$ .

### J.4 Properties of $W_{c,d}$

Recall from Equation (15) that when  $\theta = M\pi/(N - N_v)$

$$W_{c,d} = \frac{L_d + L_p}{2v} = \frac{9R + \frac{kRM\pi}{N - N_v}}{9v}. \quad (78)$$

Consider derivatives:

$$\frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} = - \frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v - 9R^3 \bar{q} - 3 \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{6v \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}, \quad (79)$$

where the critical  $R$  is  $R_c = \sqrt[3]{\frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v}{36 \bar{q}}}$  which increases with  $k$  and  $\bar{q}$ .

$$\frac{dW_{c,d}}{dk} = \frac{\pi R_a^2 M R k}{3 \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}} > 0. \quad (80)$$

For  $R$ , when  $R \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $dW_{c,d}/dR = \bar{q}/(v\bar{q}) > 0$ . When  $R \rightarrow 0^+$ ,  $dW_{c,d}/dR \rightarrow -\infty$ . Therefore,  $W_{c,d}$  first decreases then increases with  $R$ . Through other derivatives, it can be known that  $W_{c,d}$  increases with  $k$ .

## 1 J.5 Properties of $W_{c,a}$

2 Recall from Equation (4) that  $W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2(q/\bar{N}_w)}$  where  $\bar{N}_w = N - N_v + \lambda\tau/2$  (see Equation (28)), and thus

$$3 \quad W_{c,a} = \frac{(k-1) \left( 3R^3\bar{q} + \sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6R^2 \bar{q} k v}. \quad (81)$$

4 Consider derivatives:

$$5 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dR} = - \frac{(k-1) \left( \pi MR_a^2 k^2 v - 9R^3 \bar{q} - 3\sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6k v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi MR_a^2 k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}}, \quad (82)$$

6 which is negative when  $\pi MR_a^2 k^2 v > 9R^3 \bar{q} + 3\sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}$  (e.g., large  $R$  or large  $\bar{q}$ , etc.) and non-  
7 negative otherwise, and it shows that  $W_{c,a}$  first decreases and then increases with  $R$ .

$$8 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dk} = \frac{R \left( 2\pi MR_a^2 k^3 v + 9R^3 \bar{q} + 3\sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6k^2 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi MR_a^2 k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}} > 0, \quad (83)$$

9 which indicates that  $W_{c,a}$  increases with  $k$ .

## 10 J.6 Properties of $W_c$

11 The customer total waiting time is the summation of all customer waiting times, i.e.,  $W_c = W_{c,q} + W_{c,d} + W_p + W_{c,a}$ .

12 Consider derivatives

$$13 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dR} = - \frac{\pi MR_a^2 k^2 (2k-1)v - 9R^3 \bar{q} (2k-1) - 3(2k+3) \sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}}{6k v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi MR_a^2 k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}}, \quad (84)$$

14 which is negative when  $R$  is small and non-negative when  $R$  is large, and it indicates that  $W_c$  first decreases and then  
15 increases with  $R$ .

$$16 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dk} = \frac{R \left( 4\pi MR_a^2 k^3 v + 9R^3 \bar{q} - 9\sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6k^2 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi MR_a^2 k^2 v + 9R^3 \bar{q})}}, \quad (85)$$

17 which is non-negative when  $R$  is small (i.e., the included customer demand is low) such that  $4\pi MR_a^2 k^3 v \geq -9R^3 \bar{q} +$   
18  $9\sqrt{2\pi MR^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^6 \bar{q}^2}$ , and it is first non-negative and then negative when  $R$  is large.

## 19 Appendix K Proof of Table 3

### 20 K.1 Properties of $N_v$

21 Recall from Equation (30) that when  $R_s = R + W_{fp}v/2 = R - R/k - \tau v/4 + v\tau_M/2$  and  $q = \bar{q}R^2/R_a^2$ ,

$$22 \quad N_v = N - \frac{3R^2 \bar{q} (2R_s - \tau v) + 2\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 MR^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{6R_a^2 k v}. \quad (86)$$

23  $R_s = R + W_{fp}v/2 > R$ , thus  $2R_s > \tau v$ . Also,  $dR_s/dR = 1 - 1/k > 0$ ,  $N_v$  decreases with  $R$ .

$$24 \quad \frac{dN_v}{dk} = \frac{-\frac{R^3 \bar{q}}{k} - \frac{2\pi R_a^2 MR^3 \bar{q} k^2 v}{9} + \frac{R^5 \bar{q}^2 R_s}{k}}{\sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 MR^3 \bar{q} k^2 v}{9} + R^4 \bar{q}^2 R_s^2}} - \frac{R^2 \bar{q} \tau v}{2} + R^2 \bar{q} R_s + \sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 MR^3 \bar{q} k^2 v}{9} + R^4 \bar{q}^2 R_s^2}}{R_a^2 k^2 v} \quad (87)$$

$$R^2 \bar{q} \left( -\frac{R}{k} - \frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + \frac{RR_s}{k}}{9R\bar{q}} - \frac{\tau v}{2} + R_s + \sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + R_s^2}{9R\bar{q}}} \right) = \frac{R_a^2 k^2 v}{R_a^2 k^2 v}. \quad (88)$$

Since  $R_s > R$ ,  $R_s - \frac{R}{k} - \frac{\tau v}{2} > R - \frac{R}{k} - \frac{\tau v}{2} > 0$ . Also,  $\sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + R_s^2}{9R\bar{q}}} - \frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + \frac{RR_s}{k}}{9R\bar{q}} > \sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + R_s^2}{9R\bar{q}}} - \frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + \frac{RR_s}{k}}{9R\bar{q}} >$

$\sqrt{\frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + R_s^2}{9R\bar{q}}} - \frac{2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + \frac{RR_s}{k}}{9R\bar{q}} > 0$  because  $R_s^2 > \frac{RR_s}{k}$ . Thus,  $\frac{\partial N_v}{\partial k} > 0$ , which indicates that  $N_v$  increases with  $k$ .

## K.2 Properties of $N_b$ , $W_p$ , $W_{c,q}$ , $W_{c,a}$ , $W_{v,q}$ , $\lambda$ , $W_v$

Their properties are the same as those of the scenario when  $W_{fp} = 0$  by the same logic.

## K.3 Properties of $W_{c,d}$

Recall from Equation (15) that

$$W_{c,d} = \frac{L_d + L_p}{2v} = \frac{W_{v,d} + W_p}{2}, \quad (89)$$

where  $W_{v,d} = \frac{N - N_v}{\lambda} - W_p - W_{fp} + \frac{\tau}{2}$ . If we consider  $W_{c,d}$  as a function of  $R$  and  $R_s$  and  $R_s$  as a function of  $R$ , we have

$$\frac{dW_{c,d}(R)}{dR} = \frac{\partial W_{c,d}(R, R_s)}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial W_{c,d}(R, R_s)}{\partial R_s} \frac{dR_s(R)}{dR} \quad (90)$$

$$= \frac{-\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v + 6\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{6kv\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}} + \frac{(k-1)\left(3R^2 R_s \bar{q} + \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}\right)}{2kv\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}} \quad (91)$$

$$= \frac{-\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v + 9R^2 R_s \bar{q}(k-1) + 3(k+1)\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{6kv\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}. \quad (92)$$

The numerator is an increasing function of  $R$ . When  $R \rightarrow 0^+$ ,  $\frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} \rightarrow -\infty$  and when  $R \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $\frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} \rightarrow \frac{1}{v} > 0$ . Therefore,  $W_{c,d}$  first decreases then increases with  $R$ .

Similar to  $R$ , consider  $W_{c,d}$  as a function of  $k$  and  $R_s$  and  $R_s$  as a function of  $k$ ,

$$\frac{dW_{c,d}(k)}{dk} = \frac{\partial W_{c,d}(k, R_s)}{\partial k} + \frac{\partial W_{c,d}(k, R_s)}{\partial R_s} \frac{dR_s(k)}{dk} \quad (93)$$

$$= \frac{\pi R_a^2 M R k^3 v - 3R\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{3k^2 v\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}} + \frac{3R^3 R_s \bar{q} + R\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{2k^2 v\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}} \quad (94)$$

$$= \frac{R\left(2\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v + 9R^2 R_s \bar{q} - 3\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}\right)}{6k^2 v\sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}, \quad (95)$$

which is greater than 0 when  $k \geq 2$ . Therefore,  $W_{c,d}$  increases with  $k$ .

## 1 K.4 Properties of $W_{v,d}$

2 Recall from Equation (12) that  $W_{v,d} = 2R(1 + k\theta/9 - 1/k)/v = 2W_{c,d} - W_p$ . Then,  $W_{v,d}$  increases with  $k$ .

3 For  $R$ , since  $W_{v,d} = 2W_{c,d} - W_p$ ,  $\partial W_{v,d}/\partial R = 2\partial W_{c,d}/\partial R - 2/(kv)$ . Similar to the scenario for  $W_{c,d}$ , there  
4 exists a zero point of the derivative.

## 5 K.5 Properties of $W_{fp}$

6  $W_{fp} = -\frac{2R}{kv} - \frac{\tau}{2} + \tau_M$ , which decreases with  $R$  and increases with  $k$ .

## 7 K.6 Properties of $W_{c,a}$

8 Recall from Equation (4) that  $W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2(q/\bar{N}_w)}$  where  $\bar{N}_w = N - N_v + \lambda\tau/2$  (see Equation (30)). Let  $R_s = R + W_s v/2$ ,  
9 we have

$$10 \quad W_{c,a} = \frac{(k-1) \left( 3R^2 R_s \bar{q} + \sqrt{2\pi M R^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6R^2 \bar{q} k v}. \quad (96)$$

11 Consider derivatives:

$$12 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dR} = -\frac{(k-1) \left( \pi R_a^2 M k^3 v - 9(k-1) R^2 R_s \bar{q} - 3(k-1) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2} \right)}{6k^2 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R R_s^2 \bar{q})}}, \quad (97)$$

13 which is negative when  $\pi R_a^2 M k^3 v - 9(k-1) R^2 R_s \bar{q} - 3(k-1) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}$  (e.g., large  $R$  or large  $\bar{q}$ ,  
14 etc.) and non-negative otherwise, and it shows that  $W_{c,a}$  first decreases and then increases with  $R$ .

$$15 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dk} = \frac{2\pi R_a^2 M R k^4 v + 9R^2 R_s \bar{q} (Rk - R + R_s k) + (3Rk - 3R + 3R_s k) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{12k^3 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R R_s^2 \bar{q})}} > 0, \quad (98)$$

16 which indicates that  $W_{c,a}$  increases with  $k$ .

## 17 K.7 Properties of $W_c$

18 Consider derivatives

$$19 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dR} = \frac{\partial W_c}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial W_c}{\partial R_s} \frac{dR_s}{dR} \quad (99)$$

$$20 \quad = -\frac{\pi R_a^2 M k^3 (2k-1)v - 9R^2 R_s \bar{q} (2k-1)(k-1) - (6k^2 - 3k + 3) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{6k^2 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R R_s^2 \bar{q})}}, \quad (100)$$

21 which is negative when  $R$  is small such that  $\pi R_a^2 M k^3 (2k-1)v > 9R^2 R_s \bar{q} (2k-1)(k-1) + (6k^2 - 3k +$   
22  $3) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}$  and non-negative otherwise. Therefore,  $W_c$  first decreases and then increases with  
23  $R$ .

$$24 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dk} = \frac{\partial W_c}{\partial k} + \frac{\partial W_c}{\partial R_s} \frac{dR_s}{dk} \quad (101)$$

$$25 \quad = \frac{4\pi R_a^2 M R k^4 v + 18R^3 R_s \bar{q} k + 9R^2 R_s^2 \bar{q} (k-1) + (3R_s k - 3R) \sqrt{2\pi R_a^2 M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 v + 9R^4 R_s^2 \bar{q}^2}}{6k^3 v \sqrt{R^3 \bar{q} (2\pi R_a^2 M k^2 v + 9R R_s^2 \bar{q})}} > 0, \quad (102)$$

26 which shows that  $W_c$  increases with  $k$ .

## 1 Appendix L Proof of Table 4

### 2 L.1 Properties of $N_b$

$$3 \quad N_b = \frac{4\pi MR^3 k \bar{q}}{18R_a^2 N k v - 9R^2 \bar{q} \tau v} + \frac{R^2 \bar{q} \tau_M}{R_a^2 k} + \frac{2R^3 \bar{q}}{R_a^2 k v} - \frac{2R^3 \bar{q}}{R_a^2 k^2 v} + \frac{R^2 \bar{q} \tau}{R_a^2 k} - N \quad (103)$$

$$4 \quad = \frac{4\pi MR k \lambda}{9v(2N - \lambda\tau)} - N + \frac{2R\lambda}{v} - \frac{2R\lambda}{kv} + \lambda\tau + \lambda\tau_M \quad (104)$$

$$5 \quad = \frac{4\pi MR k}{9v(2N/\lambda - \tau)} - N + \frac{2R\lambda}{v} \left(1 - \frac{1}{k}\right) + \lambda\tau + \lambda\tau_M, \quad (105)$$

6 which increases with  $R$  and decreases with  $k$ , since  $k \geq 2$ .

### 7 L.2 Properties of $W_{v,d}$

$$8 \quad W_{v,d} = \frac{N - N_v}{\lambda} - W_p - W_{fp} + \frac{\tau}{2}, \quad (106)$$

$$9 \quad \frac{dW_{v,d}}{dR} = \frac{8\pi R_a^4 M N k^4 + 4\pi R_a^2 M R^2 \bar{q} k^3 \tau + 18R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2 (k-1) + 72R_a^2 N k (k-1)(R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)}{9kv(2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} > 0, \quad (107)$$

$$10 \quad \frac{dW_{v,d}}{dk} = \frac{2R(4\pi R_a^4 M N k^4 + 36R_a^4 N^2 k^2 - 4\pi R_a^2 M R^2 \bar{q} k^3 \tau - 36R_a^2 N R^2 \bar{q} k \tau + 9R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2)}{9k^2 v (2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} > 0. \quad (108)$$

### 11 L.3 Properties of $W_{c,d}$

$$12 \quad W_{v,d} = \frac{N - N_v}{\lambda} - W_p - W_{fp} + \frac{\tau}{2}, \quad (109)$$

$$13 \quad W_{c,d} = \frac{W_{v,d} + W_p}{2}. \quad (110)$$

14 Since  $N > N_v = \lambda\tau$ ,  $R_a^2 N k > R^2 \bar{q} \tau$ , then we have

$$15 \quad \frac{dW_{c,d}}{dR} = \frac{4\pi R_a^4 M N k^3 + 36R_a^4 N^2 k^2 + 2\pi R_a^2 M R^2 \bar{q} k^2 \tau - 36R_a^2 N R^2 \bar{q} k \tau + 9R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2}{9v(2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} > 0, \quad (111)$$

$$16 \quad \frac{dW_{c,d}}{dk} = \frac{4\pi R_a^2 M R k (R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)}{9v(2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} > 0. \quad (112)$$

### 17 L.4 Properties of $W_{fp}$

$$18 \quad W_{fp} = \tau_M - W_{c,q} - W_p \quad (113)$$

$$19 \quad = -\frac{4\pi MR k}{18Nv - 9\frac{\bar{q} R^2}{R_a^2 k} \tau v} + \frac{N}{\lambda} - \frac{2R}{v} - \frac{\tau}{2}, \quad (114)$$

20 which decreases with  $R$ .

$$21 \quad \frac{dW_{fp}}{dk} = \frac{R_a^2 (36R_a^4 N^3 k^2 v - 8\pi R_a^2 M N R^3 \bar{q} k^2 - 36R_a^2 N^2 R^2 \bar{q} k \tau v + 8\pi M R^5 \bar{q}^2 k \tau + 9N R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2 v)}{9R^2 \bar{q} v (2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} \quad (115)$$

$$22 \quad = \frac{R_a^2 [(36R_a^2 N^2 k v - 8\pi M R^3 \bar{q} k)(R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau) + 9N R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2 v]}{9R^2 \bar{q} v (2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2}, \quad (116)$$

1 where  $R_a^2 N k > R^2 \bar{q} \tau$  because  $N > \lambda \tau$ . To compare  $36 R_a^2 N^2 k v$  and  $8 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k$ , we compare the result of  $36 R_a^2 N^2 k v$   
 2 divided by  $8 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k$  with 1:

$$3 \quad \frac{36 R_a^2 N^2 k v}{8 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k} = \frac{N \frac{N}{M}}{\frac{2 \pi R k}{9 v} \frac{R^2 \bar{q}}{R_a^2 k}}, \quad (117)$$

4 which is greater than 1 because  $N > M$ , and the denominator represents the number of drivers who are transversely  
 5 traveling, which is normally much smaller than the fleet size. Consequently,  $W_{fp}$  increases with  $k$ .

## 6 L.5 Properties of $W_{c,q}$

$$7 \quad W_{c,q} = \frac{N_b \tau}{N_v} - \frac{\tau}{2} = \frac{N_b}{\lambda} - \frac{\tau}{2} \quad (118)$$

$$8 \quad = \frac{4 \pi M R k}{18 N v - 9 \frac{\bar{q} R^2}{R_a^2 k} \tau v} - \frac{N}{\lambda} + \frac{2 R}{v} - \frac{2 R}{k v} + \frac{\tau}{2} + \tau_M. \quad (119)$$

9 It is straightforward that  $W_{c,q}$  increases with  $R$ . For  $k$ , consider the derivative:

$$10 \quad \frac{dW_{c,q}}{dk} = - \frac{(9 R_a^2 N^2 k^2 v - 2 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 - 18 N R^3 \bar{q})(R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau) \cdot 4 R_a^2 k + 9 R_a^2 N R^4 \bar{q}^2 k^2 \tau^2 v - 18 R^7 \bar{q}^3 \tau^2}{9 R^2 \bar{q} k^2 v (2 R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2}. \quad (120)$$

11 This derivative is negative as follows. Since the number of drivers who are heading for pickup and delivery  
 12 should be smaller than the vehicle fleet size, we have

$$13 \quad N > \frac{2 R \bar{q} R^2}{v R_a^2 k} + \frac{2 \theta R k \bar{q} R^2}{9 v R_a^2 k}. \quad (121)$$

14 Then, multiply both sides with  $N k^2$

$$15 \quad N^2 k^2 > \frac{2 R \bar{q} R^2}{v R_a^2} N k + \frac{2 M \pi R k \bar{q} R^2}{9 v R_a^2} \frac{N}{N - N_v + \frac{\lambda \tau}{2}} k \quad (122)$$

$$16 \quad > \frac{2 R \bar{q} R^2}{v R_a^2} N k + \frac{2 \pi M R k \bar{q} R^2}{9 v R_a^2} k. \quad (123)$$

17 Simplify and we obtain

$$18 \quad 9 R_a^2 N^2 k^2 v > 18 \bar{q} R^3 N k + 2 \pi M \bar{q} R^3 k^2 > 18 N R^3 \bar{q} + 2 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k^2, \quad (124)$$

19 which shows that the right-hand side is the term inside the first parenthesis of the numerator of [Equation \(120\)](#),  
 20  $9 R_a^2 N^2 k^2 v - 2 \pi M R^3 \bar{q} k^2 - 18 N R^3 \bar{q}$  is greater than 0.

21 Second,  $R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau > 0$  because  $N > \lambda \tau$ .

22 Third,  $\frac{1}{q/M} \geq \tau_M > W_p = \frac{2 R}{k v}$ , then  $R_a^2 M k v > 2 R^3 \bar{q}$ , and  $R_a^2 N k^2 v > R_a^2 M k v > 2 R^3 \bar{q}$ . Then we can get  
 23  $9 R_a^2 N R^4 \bar{q}^2 k^2 \tau^2 v > 18 R^7 \bar{q}^3 \tau^2$ .

24 Finally, all the terms of the numerator of [Equation \(120\)](#) are greater than 0, and  $\frac{dW_{c,q}}{dk}$  is therefore negative.

## 25 L.6 Properties of $W_{c,a}$

26 Consider derivatives

$$27 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dR} = - \frac{N R_a^2 (k-1)}{R^3 \bar{q}} < 0, \quad (125)$$

$$28 \quad \frac{dW_{c,a}}{dk} = \frac{2 N R_a^2 k^2 - R^2 \bar{q} \tau}{4 R^2 \bar{q} k^2} > 0, \quad (126)$$

29 which shows that  $W_{c,a}$  decreases with  $R$  and increases with  $k$ .

## 1 L.7 Properties of $W_c$

2 Since  $W_{fp} = \tau_M - W_p - W_{cq}$ , we have

$$3 \quad W_c = W_{c,a} + W_{c,d} + \tau_M, \quad (127)$$

$$4 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dR} = -\frac{R_a^2 M(k-1)}{R^3 \bar{q}} + \frac{4\pi R_a^4 M N k^3 + 36R_a^4 N^2 k^2 + 2\pi R_a^2 M R^2 \bar{q} k^2 \tau - 36R_a^2 N R^2 \bar{q} k \tau + 9R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2}{9v(2R_a^2 N k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2}, \quad (128)$$

5 which approaches  $-\infty$  when  $R \rightarrow 0^+$  and approaches  $1/v > 0$  when  $R \rightarrow \infty$ . Also, on the boundary condition  
6  $\mathcal{L}_{SD,DD}$ , we have  $\frac{dW_c}{dR} = -\frac{2NR_a^2 k^2 v - NR_a^2 k v - R^3 \bar{q}}{R^3 \bar{q} k v} < 0$ , and on  $\mathcal{L}_e$ , we have  $\frac{dW_c}{dR} = -\frac{2NR_a^2 k^2 v - NR_a^2 k v - 2R^3 \bar{q}}{R^3 \bar{q} k v} < 0$ .  
7 Thus,  $W_c$  decreases with  $R$ .

$$8 \quad \frac{dW_c}{dk} = \frac{16\pi M R^3 R_a^2 \bar{q} k^3 (N k R_a^2 - \bar{q} \tau R^2) + 36N^2 R_a^4 k^2 v (2N k^2 R_a^2 - 2\bar{q} k \tau R^2 - \bar{q} \tau R^2) + 18N R^4 R_a^2 \bar{q}^2 k (k+2) \tau^2 v - 9R^6 \bar{q}^3 \tau^3 v}{36R^2 \bar{q} k^2 v (2N R_a^2 k - R^2 \bar{q} \tau)^2} > 0, \quad (129)$$

9 which shows that  $W_c$  increases with  $k$ .

## 10 Appendix M Proof of part of Proposition 3

11 In the WP-DD scenario,  $k$  increases customer total waiting time, and thus a small  $k$  is featured. For the delivery  
12 radius, we first look at accumulation time  $W_{c,a}$  and customers' delivery time  $W_{c,d}$  because  $W_c = \tau_M + W_{c,a} + W_{c,d}$ .  
13 On the boundary  $\mathcal{L}_e$  we have

$$14 \quad k_c = \frac{3R^2 \bar{q} \left( 6R_a N R + 3R_a N \tau v + \sqrt{2R} \sqrt{18R_a^2 N^2 + 4\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau + \pi M R \bar{q} \tau^2 v} \right)}{2R_a \left( 9R_a^2 N^2 v - 2\pi M R^3 \bar{q} \right)}. \quad (130)$$

15 We know from Equation (4) that  $W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2(q/N_w)}$ . Since we assume homogeneous demand for all merchants,  
16 it can also be written as

$$17 \quad W_{c,a} = \frac{k-1}{2(q_{\text{sector}})} = \frac{k-1}{2(q_{\text{single merchant}}/N_{\text{sectors}})} = \frac{k-1}{2(q/M/(\pi/\theta))}. \quad (131)$$

18 Substituting  $k = k_c$  into the above equation, we have  $W_{c,a} = W_{c,a}(R)$  meaning that  $W_{c,a}$  is a function of  $R$  on the  
19 curve  $\mathcal{L}_e$ . Since  $k_c$  increases with  $R$  according to Lemma 1, to prove  $W_{c,a}(R)$  increases with  $R$ , we then prove  $q_{\text{sector}}$   
20 decreases with  $R$ . Consider derivatives

$$21 \quad \frac{dq_{\text{sector}}}{dR} = -\frac{3\bar{q}(8R + \tau v) \left( \begin{array}{c} 324\sqrt{2}\Delta^4 N^4 + 72\sqrt{2}\pi\Delta^2 M N^2 R^2 \bar{q} \tau \\ + 9\sqrt{2}\pi\Delta^2 M N^2 R \bar{q} \tau^2 v + 2\sqrt{2}\pi^2 M^2 R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2 \\ + (-108\Delta^3 N^3 - 12\pi\Delta M N R^2 \bar{q} \tau) \sqrt{18\Delta^2 N^2 + 4\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau + \pi M R \bar{q} \tau^2 v} \end{array} \right)}{2\Delta \left( 18\Delta^2 N^2 - 3\sqrt{2}\Delta N \sqrt{18\Delta^2 N^2 + 4\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau + \pi M R \bar{q} \tau^2 v} + 2\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau \right)^2 \cdot \sqrt{18\Delta^2 N^2 + 4\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau + \pi M R \bar{q} \tau^2 v}}. \quad (132)$$

22 We look into the numerator:

$$23 \quad \text{numerator} = 324\sqrt{2}\Delta^4 N^4 + 72\sqrt{2}\pi\Delta^2 M N^2 R^2 \bar{q} \tau + 9\sqrt{2}\pi\Delta^2 M N^2 R \bar{q} \tau^2 v + 2\sqrt{2}\pi^2 M^2 R^4 \bar{q}^2 \tau^2 \\ 24 \quad + (-108\Delta^3 N^3 - 12\pi\Delta M N R^2 \bar{q} \tau) \sqrt{18\Delta^2 N^2 + 4\pi M R^2 \bar{q} \tau + \pi M R \bar{q} \tau^2 v}. \quad (133)$$

25 Let  $exp_A$  be the first line of the above expression and  $exp_B$  be the second line, since  $exp_A^2 - exp_B^2 =$   
26  $2\pi^2 M^2 R^2 \bar{q}^2 \tau^4 (9\Delta^2 N^2 v - 2\pi M R^3 \bar{q})^2 > 0$ , we have the numerator of Equation (132) is greater than 0 and thus  
27  $\frac{dq_{\text{sector}}}{dR} < 0$ .

28 Then, we have  $\frac{W_{c,a}(R)}{dR} > 0$ , which means that to seek smaller  $W_c$ , one should move toward the bottom-left  
29 direction (reduce  $R$  and meanwhile reduce  $k$ ) along with  $\mathcal{L}_e$  the  $R-k$  coordinate system.

## 1 Appendix N Proof of Proposition 4

2 The formulation of  $q_t$  is shown as follows:

$$3 \quad q_t = \begin{cases} q, & \text{stable system,} \\ \hat{q} = \frac{2Rk(2\pi Mk + 18N + 9N\tau v/R - 2\Delta_q)}{9\tau(4R + \tau v)}, & \text{unstable system,} \end{cases} \quad (134)$$

4 where  $\Delta_q = \sqrt{\pi^2 M^2 k^2 + 18\pi MNk + 9\pi MNk\tau v/R + 81N^2}$ , and  $q_t$  in an unstable system is solved by the critical  
5 condition  $N_v = \lambda\tau$  and  $W_{fp} = 0$ .

6 We first discover the relationship between  $q_t$  and  $R$ . Rearranging Equation (36), we obtain

$$7 \quad q_t = \frac{2k \left( 2R\pi Mk + 18RN + 9N\tau v - 2\sqrt{\pi^2 M^2 k^2 R^2 + 18\pi MNkR^2 + 9\pi MNk\tau vR + 81N^2 R^2} \right)}{9\tau(4R + \tau v)} \quad (135)$$

$$8 \quad = \frac{2k \left( 2R(\pi Mk - 9N) + 9N(4R + \tau v) - 2\sqrt{(\pi Mk - 9N)^2 R^2 + 9\pi MNkR(4R + \tau v)} \right)}{9\tau(4R + \tau v)} \quad (136)$$

$$9 \quad = 2k \left( 2\frac{R}{4R + \tau v} \frac{\pi Mk - 9N}{9\tau} + \frac{N}{\tau} - \frac{2}{\tau} \sqrt{\left( \frac{\pi Mk - 9N}{9} \right)^2 \left( \frac{R}{4R + \tau v} \right)^2 + \frac{\pi MNk}{9} \frac{R}{4R + \tau v}} \right). \quad (137)$$

10 Denote two auxiliary variables  $R_q = \frac{R}{4R + \tau v} \in \left[ 0, \frac{1}{4} \right)$  and  $a = \frac{\pi Mk - 9N}{9}$ . We have

$$11 \quad q_t = \frac{2k}{\tau} \left( 2aR_q + N - 2\sqrt{a^2 R_q^2 + (a + N)NR_q} \right), \quad (138)$$

12 and its derivative with respect to  $R_q$  is

$$13 \quad \frac{\partial q_t}{\partial R_q} = - \frac{2k \left( N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a\sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2} \right)}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}}. \quad (139)$$

14 For  $a < 0$ ,

$$15 \quad \frac{\partial q_t}{\partial R_q} = - \frac{2k \left( N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a\sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2} \right)}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} \quad (140)$$

$$16 \quad < - \frac{2k \left( N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a\sqrt{N^2 R_q^2 + 2NR_q^2 a + R_q^2 a^2} \right)}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} \quad (141)$$

$$17 \quad = - \frac{2k \left[ N(N + a) + 2R_q a^2 - 2aR_q(N + a) \right]}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} < 0. \quad (142)$$

18 Therefore,  $\partial q_t / R_q < 0$  for  $a < 0$ . For  $a \geq 0$ ,

$$19 \quad \frac{\partial q_t}{\partial R_q} = - \frac{2k \left( N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a\sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2} \right)}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} \quad (143)$$

$$20 \quad < - \frac{2k \left( N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a\sqrt{N^2/4 + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2} \right)}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} \quad (144)$$

$$21 \quad = - \frac{2k \left[ N^2 + Na + 2R_q a^2 - 2a(N/2 + R_q a) \right]}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} \quad (145)$$

$$22 \quad = - \frac{2kN^2}{\tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q + NR_q a + R_q^2 a^2}} < 0. \quad (146)$$

1 Therefore,  $\partial q_t/R_q < 0$  for all  $a$  because  $\frac{dq_t}{dR} = \frac{\partial q_t}{\partial R_q} \frac{dR_q}{dR}$ , where  $\frac{dR_q}{dR} > 0$ .

2 For  $k$ , consider another auxiliary variable  $k_q = a + N = \pi M k/9$ . Then the derivative of Equation (138) with  
 3 respect to  $k_q$  is

$$4 \quad \frac{\partial q_t}{\partial k_q} = - \frac{18 \left( 2N^2 R_q^2 - 6N R_q^2 k_q + 3N R_q k_q + 4R_q^2 k_q^2 + (2N R_q - N - 4R_q k_q) \sqrt{N^2 R_q^2 - 2N R_q^2 k_q + N R_q k_q + R_q^2 k_q^2} \right)}{\pi M \tau \sqrt{N^2 R_q^2 - 2N R_q^2 k_q + N R_q k_q + R_q^2 k_q^2}}. \quad (147)$$

5 The numerator is negative because if we denote  $LHS = 2N^2 R_q^2 - 6N R_q^2 k_q + 3N R_q k_q + 4R_q^2 k_q^2 >$   
 6  $0$  and  $RHS = -(2N R_q - N - 4R_q k_q) \sqrt{N^2 R_q^2 - 2N R_q^2 k_q + N R_q k_q + R_q^2 k_q^2}$ , then  $LHS^2 - RHS^2 =$   
 7  $N^3 R_q (4R_q - 1) (N R_q - 2R_q k_q + k_q) > 0$ , which indicates that the numerator  $= LHS - RHS > 0$ . Therefore,  
 8 the derivative of  $q_t$  with respect to  $k_q$  is greater than 0 and  $dq_t/dk > 0$ .